The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to attenuate the plague of the credit crunch, which is very common in this period: despite the banking world has available a huge amount of money, there is no available money in the real economy. Con- sequently, we want to find a way to allow a global economic recovery by adopting Game Theory, and in particular the new mathematical model of “Coopetitive Game”. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. At this purpose, we examine an interaction between the above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The solution which allows both players to win the maximum possible sum, and therefore the one desirable for both players, is represented by a coopetitive agreement between the two subjects. So the Enterprise artificially causes (also thanks to the money loaned by the Financial Institute that received them by the ECB) an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute takes the op- portunity to win the maximum possible sum of the coopetitive game (the two players even arrive to the maximum of the game). In fact, the Financial Institute is almost forced to reach an agreement with the Enterprise because the Financial Institute is unable to make arbitrages alone because of the introduction, by the normative authority, of an economic transactions tax to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations). We propose hereunder a possible division (a fair transferable utility agreement) of the win, in order to avoid that the envy of the Enterprise, which gains a much less advantage from the adoption of a coopetitive strategy, may compromise the success of the interaction.

Credit crunch in the Euro area: a coopetitive solution

CARFI', David;
2013-01-01

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to attenuate the plague of the credit crunch, which is very common in this period: despite the banking world has available a huge amount of money, there is no available money in the real economy. Con- sequently, we want to find a way to allow a global economic recovery by adopting Game Theory, and in particular the new mathematical model of “Coopetitive Game”. Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. At this purpose, we examine an interaction between the above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The solution which allows both players to win the maximum possible sum, and therefore the one desirable for both players, is represented by a coopetitive agreement between the two subjects. So the Enterprise artificially causes (also thanks to the money loaned by the Financial Institute that received them by the ECB) an inconsistency between spot and future markets, and the Financial Institute takes the op- portunity to win the maximum possible sum of the coopetitive game (the two players even arrive to the maximum of the game). In fact, the Financial Institute is almost forced to reach an agreement with the Enterprise because the Financial Institute is unable to make arbitrages alone because of the introduction, by the normative authority, of an economic transactions tax to stabilize the financial market, in order to protect it from speculations). We propose hereunder a possible division (a fair transferable utility agreement) of the win, in order to avoid that the envy of the Enterprise, which gains a much less advantage from the adoption of a coopetitive strategy, may compromise the success of the interaction.
2013
9783642356346
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11570/2483821
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