Consequences of the pragmatics of belief

The structure of my paper is the following: a. A resume of the classical papers on ‘de se’, including recent papers by Higginbotham (2003) and Recanati (2009). b. A discussion of the recent pragmatics literature on ‘de se’ attitudes (linguistics); c. A discussion of pragmatic intrusion in connection with the first-person pronoun; d. A discussion of the logical connection between the first-personal dimension, the internal dimension and immunity to error through misidentification. Is immunity to error through misidentification dependent on the intrusion of the EGO concept in a ‘de se’ construction? What kind of relationship is there between immunity to error through misidentification and the internal dimension of ‘de se’? e. Pragmatics and the internal dimension (whether partial or full); f. Immunity to error through misidentification: semantic (Higginbotham 2003) or pragmatic (Recanati 2009)? Or how to diffuse the dichotomy. (Modularity and pragmatic intrusion).