Prospettive evoluzioniste nell’embodied cognition: il cervello “inquilino del corpo”.

One of the classic problems of philosophy – the mind-body problem - has been revised by issues of “embodied cognition” primarily as a part of cognitive science. However, the divi-sion of this field of study in a series of internal approaches - the famous 4E cognitions: em-bedded, embodied, enacted, extended (Rowlands, 2010: 51 et seq.) which are often in contra-diction each other – shows that the issue of embodied cognition continues to remain more a common background of problems rather than a set of solutions, at least for the moment. I think this sort of theoretical impasse is determined by the difficulty showed by of the cogniti-ve core of the theory of mind to adopt a rigorous evolutionary perspective. In this paper I will try to prove that without adopting such a perspective, it’s hard to solve the theoretical pro-blems that embodied cognition drags itself.