Civil liability for oil pollution damage from tankers is covered by the 1969 Civil Liability Convention (CLC), as emended by the 1992 Protocol for some States.The Convention constitutes a special regime departing from the ordinary law of tort, placing the liability for such damage on the owner of the ship from which the polluting oil escaped.Subject to a number of specific exceptions, this liability is strict and granted by compulsory insurance (or by other financial security), but limited to a predetermine amount. The special regime is characterized by the principle of "channelling liability" to the owner: under Art. IV of the CLC, as amended by the 1992 Protocol, no claim for compensation for pollution damage, under the Convention or otherwise, may be made against: a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs services for the ship; c) any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or operator of the ship; d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the instructions of a competent public authority; e) any person taking preventive measures; f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e); unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly. Such a regime is not exactly in line with the E.U. principle of “polluter pays”. The article - starting from the analysis of some recent rulings that have condemned various figures (others than the owner of the ship) for this type of damage, who were considered responsible for various reasons, intends to verify the effects of the principle "polluter pays" on the conventional regime.

The effects of "polluter pays " principle on the channelling of responsibility for pollution damage at sea

Cinzia Ingratoci
2018-01-01

Abstract

Civil liability for oil pollution damage from tankers is covered by the 1969 Civil Liability Convention (CLC), as emended by the 1992 Protocol for some States.The Convention constitutes a special regime departing from the ordinary law of tort, placing the liability for such damage on the owner of the ship from which the polluting oil escaped.Subject to a number of specific exceptions, this liability is strict and granted by compulsory insurance (or by other financial security), but limited to a predetermine amount. The special regime is characterized by the principle of "channelling liability" to the owner: under Art. IV of the CLC, as amended by the 1992 Protocol, no claim for compensation for pollution damage, under the Convention or otherwise, may be made against: a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; b) the pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs services for the ship; c) any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or operator of the ship; d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the instructions of a competent public authority; e) any person taking preventive measures; f) all servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c), (d) and (e); unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly. Such a regime is not exactly in line with the E.U. principle of “polluter pays”. The article - starting from the analysis of some recent rulings that have condemned various figures (others than the owner of the ship) for this type of damage, who were considered responsible for various reasons, intends to verify the effects of the principle "polluter pays" on the conventional regime.
2018
978-953-8116-20-9
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Descrizione: The effects of polluter pays principle
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11570/3129909
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