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## A multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in violent intergroup conflict settings: Differentiating actor, target, and type of action

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### ABSTRACT

Despite an increase in social psychological research on allyship, less attention has been paid to allyship action in violent intergroup conflict settings. In this contribution, first, we introduce a multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in such settings by differentiating allyship based on the a) *actors* (i.e. individuals, collectives, and societies), b) *targets* (i.e. victim- vs perpetrator-focused), and c) *types* of those actions (i.e. low- vs high-cost action). Second, we mostly draw on examples from our own research programmes and where relevant from global conflicts and previous studies on allyship to show the applicability of the proposed typology. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical implications, reflect on the limitations of past studies and suggest directions to address research gaps. Our typology contributes to the collective action and intergroup conflict literatures by showing how allyship action has been studied in conflict settings and the similarities and differences between conflict and non-conflict settings.

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In a globally interconnected yet hierarchically organised world, where some groups have more advantages than others, understanding the role of allyship is crucial. There have been recent attempts to conceptualise allyship such as “advocacy for others motivated by the values and norms of the ingroup for its own ends” (Louis et al., 2019, p. 1). Building on and extending this definition, we conceptualise *allyship actions* as low- or high-cost acts taken by individuals, collectives, or societies to change the status quo among groups in

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conflict, either by targeting victims or perpetrators of direct and structural violence.

Social psychologists historically have focused on collective action among disadvantaged groups, only shifting to study allyship in the last decade (e.g., van Zomeren & Iyer, 2009). For instance, allyship action by advantaged group members has been studied in relation to equal rights for racial minority groups (e.g., Brown & Ostrove, 2013; I. R. Johnson & Pietri, 2022), ethnic justice (Uluğ & Uysal, 2023), gender justice (e.g., Subasic et al., 2018), and LGBTQ+ rights (e.g., Russell, 2011). Allyship action has also been linked to psychological group memberships (Craig et al., 2020; Van Zomeren et al., 2008), emotions (Chong & Mohr, 2020; Roden & Saleem, 2022), beliefs and attitudes (Adra et al., 2020; Chan & Lam, 2023; Stefaniak et al., 2020; Uysal et al., 2022) as well as morality (Kende et al., 2017; van Zomeren et al., 2018). Complementing the empirical study of allyship, there is a relatively recent focus on theorising about the social psychological motivations that may produce and maintain allyship. More specifically, four motivations have been identified: (a) morality, (b) personal, (c) ingroup-focused, and (d) outgroup-focused (Radke et al., 2020; see also Woo et al., 2024). Additional theorising, however, around the different dimensions of allyship is needed because allyship is a complex and multifaceted concept that varies significantly across different contexts, communities, and social issues, as well as might have different motivations and barriers depending on the type of action, and theorising this concept will help researchers study allyship and its nuances more effectively.

Social psychological literature suggests that being an ally implies a commitment to address and disrupt the hegemonic status quo and oppressive realities through specific demands and social justice-oriented actions (Selvanathan et al., 2020, 2023). Therefore, allies, including third-parties, are seen as important agents of social change (e.g., Kutlaca et al., 2022; Saab et al., 2015; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a). The mere fact of holding privileged identities allows them to challenge systemic institutional barriers, speak out for, as well as provide a platform and protection for victim groups whose voices have been silenced or ignored. For example, in violent conflict contexts, allies can be crucial in protecting victim groups in order for them to maintain their resistance efforts against perpetrator groups and remain present in the land (see, e.g., Fleischmann, 2021). Allies' actions are believed to be particularly impactful for social change to the extent that their identities are seen as privileged among the dominant population, which confers entitlements and resources unavailable to victim groups.

Previous conceptualisations of allyship distinguish between individual *vs* collective levels (Thomas & McGarty, 2018) or costly *vs* non-costly group behaviour (Becker et al., 2022; Odağ et al., 2023), mostly directed at helping the victimised or disadvantaged social groups. Acknowledging the

importance of these ideas, in the current paper, we seek to bring more attention to the *context* in which allyship action occurs (see also De Souza & Schmader, 2024). Specifically, our focus is on settings characterised by intergroup conflict, in which there is often direct and asymmetric violence (Galtung, 1969) and a less powerful group seeks influential allies from the broader political public to increase their own capacity for organised political resistance (see also Hasan-Aslih et al., 2020, Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008). We argue that the proposed typology is timely as it underscores the role of a political context in shaping allies' willingness to intervene in conflict situations as well as their capacities to prevent escalation of human-caused humanitarian crises. Indeed, allyship has become a recurring theme in present-day intra-state (e.g., Turkish-Kurdish conflict) and inter-state struggles (e.g., Russia-Ukraine war).

Notably, there is little psychological research about allyship in intergroup conflict settings where there is direct intergroup violence (Galtung, 1969). One possible reason behind the lack of a clear and consistent scholarly understanding of allies' actions may be caused by unique characteristics of such contexts (e.g., structural barriers to intervention, limited possibilities to collect data in hostile environments) as well as the psychological phenomena associated with motivations that prompt the outsiders to join an ongoing intergroup conflict. Yet, in such settings, the motivations of, barriers to, and impact of allyship might differ due to the contextual characteristics (e.g., the risk associated with showing allyship; lower/no influence of allies on other ingroup members; Hasan-Aslih et al., 2023). Extending existing knowledge might help to answer fundamental questions regarding psychological obstacles to lasting peace. For example, the effectiveness of non-violent resistance to peace processes has been discussed by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), who argued that merely 5% of a countries' population could enact constructive, social-political change. In such contexts, allyship action might be an effective way to mobilise the general public, including advantaged group members, to enact structural change. Moreover, allies are not only members of advantaged groups, but also may include third-party actors (i.e., people who are not a party to the conflict). Allies, including third parties, in conflict settings are crucial as their actions may affect the course and outcome of intergroup conflicts (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017; Harth & Shnabel, 2015; Iyer et al., 2007; Levine et al., 2011; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a).

Despite the conceptual overlap in the collective action and intergroup conflict literature, to date, there has been no typology of allies' actions in violent intergroup conflict settings. However, a typology like this is needed because it would enhance scholars' ability to systematically examine how allies' actions are impacted by various factors as well as how those actions impact social change. Therefore, we introduce a new multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in violent intergroup conflict

settings by differentiating allyship based on the a) *actors* of those actions (i.e., individuals, collectives, or societies), b) *targets* of those actions (i.e., victim- vs perpetrator-focused) as allies' actions typically operate within a victim-perpetrator paradigm (e.g., Jankowitz, 2018), and c) *types* of those actions (i.e., low- vs high-cost action). The proposed typology thus offers a holistic and reproducible conceptual framework for achieving an integrated, multilevel understanding of allyship action in violent intergroup conflict settings. As such, this typology underscores the importance of incorporating a broader social context and structure in which allyship occurs into analysis.

### ***Our aims: why do we need an allyship typology and how does it generalise?***

We have three aims in the current contribution. First, we aim to introduce a multi-dimensional typology to help researchers conceptualise allyship actions in violent intergroup conflict settings and to illustrate different dimensions of this typology in existing empirical research. As mentioned, we define *allyship actions* as actions taken by individuals, collectives, or societies to change the status quo among groups in conflict, either by targeting victims or perpetrators of direct and structural violence. We define *such settings* as violent social contexts that are characterised by disagreement, divisions, or confrontation between two or more groups and their members (see also Tropp, 2012). By building on and extending this definition, we argue that such settings can be generally characterised by 1) disparities in group status, 2) pervasive direct violence and its many pernicious forms (including coercion and arbitrary deprivation of liberty; see also Christie, 2006; Galtung, 1969), 3) asymmetrical power relations, and 4) involvement of non-state groups. However, our typology has some constraints on generalisability (Simons et al., 2017): it is applicable to contexts where 1) intergroup relations continue to be marred by differences in group status, 2) violence is direct and pervasive, 3) asymmetrical power relations are reinforced, and 4) non-state groups may also become a party to the conflict.

Second, we aim to show what types of actions have been studied in violent intergroup conflict settings especially from a social-psychological perspective. While illustrating the allyship typology, we draw on examples mainly from our own programmes of research. However, when we do not have examples from our own research, we incorporate previous research focused on solidarity-based action without necessarily conceptualising it as allyship. This approach allows us to highlight the gaps in the literature by showing which actions have been studied more frequently and for which actions more (interdisciplinary) work is needed to understand the motivators, dynamics, and processes.

Third, with an eye towards generalisation, we aim to identify both similarities and differences (if any) across conflict and non-conflict settings in terms of studying allyship actions. This approach will highlight the overlaps and distinctions among dimensions of allyship actions between the two contexts.

### ***Positionality statements: why have we chosen to write on allyship in violent intergroup conflict settings?***

The first author, Uluğ, has been conducting research in conflict settings over the last ten years, with a focus especially on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict among others (e.g., Northern Irish, Mapuche). As an ethnically Turkish researcher from Turkey, she tried to understand how being a member of a perpetrator group in a conflict setting may motivate perpetrator group members to take action on behalf of victim group members. This is what motivated her to conceptualise allyship in conflict settings. The second author, Chayinska, has been conducting context-centred, history-informed empirical research to advance the social psychology of collective action since 2014. As an ethnically Ukrainian researcher from Ukraine who spent four years living in Latin America (Argentina and Chile), she used both qualitative and quantitative methods to conduct research in the contexts of the Russia-Ukraine military conflict and the Mapuche conflict in Araucania (South of Chile). In particular, she investigated what prompted advantaged group members in Ukraine to engage in political solidarity with Crimean Tatars who faced the forced annexation of their homeland (i.e., Crimean Peninsula) by Russia in 2014. She also examined the factors predicting outgroup trust, forgiveness, and intentions to reconcile among victim group members in the contexts of Chile's Mapuche conflict and the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The third author, Schreiber, has an academic background in psychology and has been trained as a conflict and peace practitioner. She is currently conducting PhD research on allyship in/ towards conflict settings, specifically looking into the motivators and barriers of third parties to support victim groups in Israel/Palestine and Turkey. She previously monitored different intra-state conflicts in India for annual conflict reports and worked in monitoring and evaluation for a peacebuilding NGO in Israel/Palestine. The fourth author, Taylor, is trained in psychology and peace studies; she has worked as a practitioner in intergroup conflict settings, such as Guatemala and Nepal, and as an academic in settings such as the Balkans, Colombia, Israel, and Northern Ireland, among others. Her theoretical contributions have included teasing apart the target and type of prosocial action among youth in conflict settings in the Developmental Peacebuilding Model (DPM; see Taylor, 2020). Relevant to the focus on allyship, her research has focused on constructive responses to adversity

and violence by majority and minority group members. Overall, our team's positionality guided us in how we conceptualised, understood, and researched allyship (e.g., how our own privileged positions helped us focus on the positive role of allies in conflicts and how we support non-violent allyship actions over violent ones). We invite the reader to keep it in mind while reading about our own research programme on allyship, which is presented in the following sections.

### ***How should allyship be studied? Developing a multi-dimensional typology for allyship actions in violent intergroup conflict settings***

Recent debates in the literature acknowledge the importance of the context in which allyship action takes place, suggesting investigating the peculiarity of the phenomenon outside peaceful and democratic settings (e.g., WEIRD contexts; Henrich et al., 2010), paying attention to both pitfalls and impact of allyship in non-democratic, authoritarian and conflict settings (Hasan-Aslih et al., 2023; Odağ et al., 2023; Uluğ & Uysal, 2023). To show that allyship action is not limited to non-conflict settings, we provide examples from our own research programmes, bringing together literature from allyship in collective action and conflict studies. When we do not have examples from our own research, we benefit from previous research as well as our own observations from global conflicts. That is the reason why some parts of the typology will be shorter (i.e., examples from previous research/global conflicts) than others (i.e., examples from our own research). This approach helps us highlight how allyship has been studied in violent conflict settings, where there are research gaps and how we can address those gaps in future research.

We propose a multi-dimensional typology for allyship actions in intergroup conflict settings by asking three important questions: (1) who are the *actors* that show allyship action?; (2) who are the *targets* that allyship action is aimed at?; and (3) what are the *types* of allyship action? Based on these questions, the typology distinguishes the (a) *actors* (i.e., individuals, collectives, and societies), b) *targets* (i.e., victim- vs perpetrator-focused), and c) *types* of action (i.e., low- vs high-cost; see Table 1). We also offer two examples of relevant allyship action for each cell in Table 1. We explain each question below and discuss our typology in detail.

#### ***Individuals, collectives or societies: who are the actors?***

We expand the consideration of allyship actors in two ways: considering three levels of actors as well as the actors' identities. First, the social psychology literature tends to focus on the individual- or collective-level analysis for social change (Acar & Uluğ, 2022; Uluğ & Acar, 2018). Some previous work demonstrated that there is a clear distinction between actions on the

Table 1. A multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in conflict settings.

|                 | Low-cost |                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | High-cost                                                                                                                                                                                       |                                                                                                                                                                              |
|-----------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                 | Target   | Victim (support)                                                                                                                                                                                | Perpetrator (undermine)                                                                                                                                                                                                               | Victim (support)                                                                                                                                                                                | Perpetrator (undermine)                                                                                                                                                      |
| Individual ally |          | 1.1.1.                                                                                                                                                                                          | 1.1.2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 1.2.1.                                                                                                                                                                                          | 1.2.2.                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Collective ally |          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Posting pro-victim content on social media</li><li>• Wearing clothing with pro-victim messages</li></ul>                                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Rejecting negligible, easy-to-replace services of perpetrator groups</li><li>• Signing petitions to punish perpetrators</li></ul>                                                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Offering victim groups a place to stay</li><li>• Engaging in on-site work to support victim groups (e.g., education, building infrastructure)</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Rejecting essential services of perpetrator groups</li><li>• Disrupting events that symbolise ties with perpetrator groups</li></ul> |
|                 |          | 2.1.1.                                                                                                                                                                                          | 2.1.2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 2.2.1.                                                                                                                                                                                          | 2.2.2.                                                                                                                                                                       |
|                 |          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Running online campaigns to raise awareness of victim groups in conflicts</li><li>• Placing flags of victim groups in open spaces or websites</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Collecting signatures for petitions such as human rights violations of perpetrator groups</li><li>• Boycotting institutions of perpetrator groups in international events</li></ul>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Protesting to support victim groups</li><li>• Sit-ins at train stations to support victim groups</li></ul>                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Blocking trucks with arms supplies for perpetrator groups</li><li>• Hacking technology systems of perpetrator groups</li></ul>       |
| Societal ally   |          | 3.1.1.                                                                                                                                                                                          | 3.1.2.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 3.2.1.                                                                                                                                                                                          | 3.2.2.                                                                                                                                                                       |
|                 |          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Online official announcements to show support for victim groups</li><li>• Placing flags of victim groups in front of government buildings</li></ul>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Freezing the fortune of politicians from perpetrator groups that are located abroad</li><li>• Raising awareness of propaganda of perpetrator groups in open spaces (e.g., railways)</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Sending large financial support to victim groups</li><li>• Rescuing victim groups via bus/train/plane</li></ul>                                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Imposing sanctions for perpetrator groups</li><li>• Sending diplomats of perpetrator groups away</li></ul>                           |

individual (actions taken by one person based on their personal decisions such as signing a petition) and collective (actions taken by a collection or group of people based on a shared decision such as demonstrating) level (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Thomas & McGarty, 2018; see also Acar & Uluğ, 2022) although the same actions can be shown both by individuals and collectives (e.g., displaying a flag to signal allyship). Moreover, the constructive role of individuals (e.g., Volcic & Erjavec, 2015) and collectives, such as civil society movements (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021; Davies & Kaufman, 2003), in conflict settings has been widely documented (Chayinska & McGarty, 2021). The conflict literature, however, also focuses on high-level actors such as states (e.g., Norway; Waage, 2005; see also Krieger, 2016), international associations (e.g., UN; Howard, 2007), or international organisations (e.g., ICRC; Forsythe, 1976). Therefore, we argue that allyship action in conflict settings must also include societal-level actors. Societal actions can be defined as those taken on a larger scale of social aggregation, such as actions taken by international organisations (e.g., EU, UN) or governments or political parties (see Böhm et al., 2019). Their role can range from (in)formal and legal, as in the case of arbitration (e.g., Bercovitch, 1985), to broader forms of soft power (e.g., Spector & Zartman, 2003). Taking these actors into account is crucial to understanding conflict and peace processes since they have significant power and influence due to their visibility, status, and policy-making capacities (Lederach, 1997). Thus, while not often labelled as “*allies*” in the conflict literature, these actors – across individual, collective and societal levels – have relatively privileged positions and actively work to advance the equitable well-being and structural inclusion of victimised groups (Taylor & Christie, 2015).

Second, intergroup conflict settings highlight the multiplicity of actors, and issues of identity are highly salient. Expanding the focus from advantaged groups locked in the antagonistic dispute, third parties (i.e., actors not directly involved in the dispute) are often involved in conflict settings. Allies may share overlapping identities with the victims, such as the diaspora (e.g., Irish-American support for the Northern Ireland peace process; Cochrane, 2007) and co-ethnics (e.g., Albanians in the US and UK on behalf of Kosovo; Koinova, 2013), or even collective victim identities (e.g., South Africans in support of Palestinians; Momberg, 2017; see also Vollhardt, 2020). Perpetrators can also engage in allyship, such as the US solidarity movement with Central America in the 1980s (Power & Charlip, 2009; Stuelke, 2014). Finally, the identities of third-party allies may range from overlapping identities with the conflicting parties to relatively distinct and orthogonal ethnically, politically, and geographically (e.g., Norway as a mediator for the Oslo Accord; Waage, 2005). Central across all of these examples, allies are constructively working for victimised groups in conflict settings.

### *Directed toward the victim vs perpetrator: who are the targets?*

In asymmetric intergroup conflicts, victim groups typically have lower power, with limited legal status (e.g., being not internationally recognised as a state) and fewer resources (e.g., armaments, technological, economic, demographic, and other structural resources; Berglund & Souleimanov, 2020). At the same time, perpetrator groups tend to have more power, are often recognised by other countries and have access to far more resources.

Allies can direct their allyship actions towards both groups in different ways. First, they can support the *victims*. For example, allies can empower victims by giving them a platform to amplify their voices or helping them to dismantle inequalities caused by structural violence or discrimination (e.g., economic or educational disadvantages). For example, on a collective level, allies can engage in social media campaigning (e.g., Palestine Solidarity Movement in Ireland and the UK; Abu-Ayyash, 2015). Second, allies can undermine the *perpetrators*. For example, allies can block resources that perpetrators use for oppression (e.g., barricade the roads of arms factories) or damage their international cooperation ability (e.g., impair moral image, boycott companies that support perpetrator groups; e.g., boycott of South Africa or Israel; DiStefano & Henaway, 2014). Both types of actions can be performed to diminish power inequalities between groups and catalyse social change in conflict settings.

### *Low-cost vs high-cost: what are the types of allyship action?*

Underpinning different types of allyship, the majority of the studies noted so far include low-cost action at the interpersonal level (e.g., self-reported prosociality, Taylor et al., 2014, or resource allocation, but not at “own expense,” for an exception, see Corbett et al., 2023). However, these types of behaviour have been linked to broader forms of collective (i.e., mesosystem) and societal (i.e., macrosystem) action (e.g., Taylor & Hanna, 2018). In other words, understanding some of the factors that produce or sustain allyship at the interpersonal level may also be effective at mobilising collective or even societal actors to support victimised groups or punish perpetrators. Focusing on these factors when addressing social injustice may be particularly important in conflict settings (Carlo et al., 2022), where deep history and entrenched norms that span generations (Taylor, Dautel, et al., 2020) can influence how identity-related processes influence allyship actions (see also Baysu & Uluğ, 2024).

Building on the collective action literature, we distinguish between different costs of allyship action (Schumann & Klein, 2015; Shi et al., 2015). *Costs* “refer to the material and social resources to overcome mounting injustice (e.g., energy, time, and financial loss)” (Odağ et al., 2023, p. 236). We note that costs, whether low or high, might affect whether people will take action or not. Low-cost actions, on the one hand, usually take no to little effort,

require far less time, risk, or resources, and do not have serious consequences for the actor (Corcoran et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015; see also Kutlaca & Radke, 2023, for performative allyship). High-cost actions, on the other hand, usually involve social, economic, and time-related costs and may have serious consequences, such as injury, imprisonment, and threat to life, for the actor (Corcoran et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015). Examples from previous work for low-cost collective actions include signing a petition or boycotting products, while high-cost collective actions include joining unofficial strikes or occupying buildings (Corcoran et al., 2015).

Allyship in intergroup conflict settings accentuates this cost-benefit analysis (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). For example, high-cost allyship in such settings may even be fatal. However, we should also note that these actions can be context-dependent (Odağ et al., 2023; Uluğ et al., 2022); explicit criticism for the perpetrator group may require little material resources in one setting (e.g., in a relatively more democratic context), but risk imprisonment and threat to life in another (e.g., in a relatively less democratic context). Despite the contextual variations, the importance of teasing apart low- and high-cost allyship actions is particularly crucial due to higher costs in conflict settings.

### *Actors, targets, and actions: a multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in conflict settings*

In this section, we introduce the allyship typology by drawing on examples from our complementary research programmes on allyship. In other words, the work we reviewed below mostly comes from our own research. However, when we do not have specific examples for some cells of the proposed typology, we use our own observations from global conflicts as well as benefit from previous studies to show the applicability of the proposed typology. However, these parts of the typology will be relatively shorter than the parts where we reviewed our own work. Thus, we illustrate how the dimensions of the typology of allyship action in violent conflict settings have been studied in the social-psychology literature and highlight the research gaps (see Table 2 for how the dimensions of the typology of allyship action in violent conflict settings have been studied in the social-psychology literature).

## **Individual-level allyship**

### *Individual, low-cost, victim-directed allyship*

In this type of allyship, individual allies act alone to show their support for the victim group. Their actions usually require either no or relatively few resources (e.g., money and time), have low personal costs that impact core needs like freedom or social belonging (e.g.,

**Table 2.** An illustration of how the dimensions of the typology of allyship action in conflict settings have been studied in the social-psychology literature.

| Actor \ Target  | Low-cost                                                                                                                                                                                                  |                                                                                                                            | High-cost                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                 | Victim (support)                                                                                                                                                                                          | Perpetrator (undermine)                                                                                                    | Victim (support)                                                                                                                                                        | Perpetrator (undermine)                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Individual ally | 1.1.1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Ethnic awareness</li><li>• Empathy</li></ul>                                                                                                               | 1.1.2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Efficacy beliefs</li><li>• Religiosity</li><li>• Consumer beliefs</li></ul> | 1.2.1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Identity content</li><li>• Social norms</li></ul>                                                                        | 1.2.2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Type of costs</li></ul>                                                                                                                                                    |
| Collective ally | 2.1.1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Conflict narratives</i></li><li>• <i>Intergroup contact and communication topics-Disidentification and perceived loyalty of victim groups</i></li></ul> | 2.1.2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Injustice appraisals</i></li><li>• <i>Anger</i></li></ul>                | 2.2.1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Hope</li><li>• Moral conviction</li><li>• Ally identification</li><li>• Non-violent communication intervention</li></ul> | 2.2.2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <i>Conflict narratives</i></li><li>• <i>Competitive victimhood</i></li><li>• Ideology/moral conviction</li><li>• Thrill-seeking</li><li>• Increasing self-esteem</li></ul> |
| Societal ally   | 3.1.1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Raising awareness</li><li>• Uniting around new political platforms</li></ul>                                                                               | 3.1.2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Literature gap</li></ul>                                                    | 3.2.1. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Literature gap</li></ul>                                                                                                 | 3.2.2. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Category inclusion</li><li>• Category norms</li><li>• Category interest</li></ul>                                                                                          |

Topics in italics represent our own work whereas non-italic topics represent other studies.

prison, exclusion from someone’s social circle), and are often of a symbolic nature. For example, an individual ally may hang the victim’s flag as a sign of support on their door, change their social media banner to the victim’s flag or post pro-victim messages on social media.

Most of our knowledge about individual (and collective; see below), low-cost, victim-directed allyship has come from studies on allyship in non-conflict societies (e.g., the US, Australia, Germany). These studies have shown the role of individual experiences (e.g., closeness to people targeted by prejudice; Tropp & Uluğ, 2019), various emotions (e.g., anger, empathy; Chong & Mohr, 2020; Roden & Saleem, 2022; Selvanathan et al., 2018), moralities (e.g., moral outrage and convictions; Green et al., 2023; Kende et al., 2017; van Zomeren et al., 2011), (dis-)identification processes (e.g., Craig et al., 2020; Iyer & Ryan, 2009), and beliefs and attitudes (e.g., zero-sum beliefs; Adra et al., 2020; Chan & Lam, 2023; Stefaniak et al., 2020; Uysal et al., 2022) in allyship actions.


Our research, on the other hand, so far has mostly focused on individual-level, low-cost, victim-directed allyship action in intergroup conflict settings. In the next paragraphs, we outline two factors for this type of allyship action that we have found in our work: ethnic awareness and empathy.

### *Ethnic awareness*

The *Helping Kids!* Lab, for example, has focused on individual actions towards conflict-rival targets (i.e., dual victim/perpetrator identities depending on the perspective and context), framed by the DPM (Taylor, 2020), which outlines how different types of outgroup prosocial behaviour among children and young people can contribute to consolidating peace in settings of intergroup conflict. Integrating developmental psychological and peace-building paradigms, the DPM emphasises the constructive ways that individuals, particularly children and young people, can respond to adversity. The DPM argues that prosocial behaviour towards a conflict-rival can promote social cohesion.

First, the *Helping Kids!* lab aimed to understand at what age children were aware of socially relevant groups, that is, the *targets* of allyship. We reasoned that only if children are aware of these groups, and the relative disadvantage, could they begin to act in agentic and prosocial ways to help or include such groups. To test this idea, we developed a child-friendly task that has been adopted and applied in at least six countries (Croatia; Israel; Kosovo; Northern Ireland; Republic of Ireland; Republic of North Macedonia). In one version of the task, children simply sorted pairs of images that adults categorise as being associated with one conflict-rival group over another (e.g., the Irish flag, and not the British flag, is categorised as Catholic, in the case of Northern Ireland). The greater number of images or symbols that children sorted in the hypothesised direction, above chance, was an indication of awareness of that social category. This sorting task taps into the first stage of social identity development theory (Nesdale, 2004), ethnic awareness.

In Northern Ireland, for example, we found that among children, evenly split by gender and Catholic/Protestant background, children sorted symbols above chance with both the hypothesised national (i.e., British/Irish) and ethnopolitical (i.e., Protestant/Catholic) labels (Taylor, Dautel, et al., 2020). National category awareness emerged earlier than religious-ethnic category. In addition, ethnic awareness was largely stronger for ingroup symbols, compared to outgroup symbols, and increased with age (Figure 1). In other words, children showed greater ethnic awareness of ingroup symbols, in general, perhaps reflecting the relatively divided nature of social life and with increased exposure as they aged. A similar pattern was found when we adapted this task to the Republic of North Macedonia, where tense



**Figure 1.** For each age group in the sample, the lines represent the number of images - out of 38 - that children sorted above chance ( $p < .05$ ) in the hypothesised direction for national (black) and ethno-political (grey) labels.

interethnic relations remain and can be seen in the largely separate living patterns, particularly in schools (Tomovska Misoska et al., 2020). That is 194 primary school children also sorted both ingroup and outgroup symbols with the hypothesised ethnic group, and ethnic awareness was present among the earliest school grades and increased with age. These findings suggest that socialising contexts, such as schools, may have an accumulative effect on ethnic awareness. Similar patterns of findings emerged in other conflict-affected societies (e.g., Dautel et al., 2020) and towards marginalised ethnic groups (i.e., Irish Travellers; Counihan et al., 2022).

These child-friendly quantitative tasks have been supported by complementary qualitative work. For example, we conducted a thematic analysis to understand how Jews and Arab-Muslims in middle childhood perceive the difference between these two ethno-religious groups in Israel (Shamoa-Nir et al., 2022). We found two themes: differences (a) in everyday ethnic and cultural properties and (b) related to religion. Providing validity to the sorting task, children spontaneously brought up differences in religious customs, traditions, clothing and symbols, which reflect their ethnic awareness. Towards understanding allyship, this set of studies suggests that awareness of group identities emerges and grows across primary school years. These findings raise the question: If children are aware of such groups, will they act in ways consistent with allyship?

Second, using a variation of the quantitative task, we examined if ingroup preferences shaped children's prosocial behaviours (e.g., sharing) towards conflict rivals as one aspect of allyship in this age group (Bähr et al., 2021).

This series of studies tease apart similarities and differences related to contexts, such as the recency and intensity of violence and majority/minority group status. For example, 1,236 children participated in the series of interactive games. Settings of more recent and intense conflict (i.e., Israel and Kosovo) showed greater differences in prosocial resource distribution tasks across ingroup and outgroup members compared to settings where a generation past the formal cessation of conflict (i.e., Croatia, Northern Ireland, Republic of North Macedonia; Bähr et al., 2021). In other words, we found differential prosocial giving, exacerbating inequality to working against allyship goals. This, furthermore, indicates that there might be a higher barrier to becoming an ally in intergroup conflict settings.

Despite mean-level differences in prosocial giving towards conflict rivals, our research has found similarities across contexts in the underlying mechanisms (Taylor et al., 2021). More specifically, supporting social identity development theory, a multiple-group mediation across children in three postaccord settings (Northern Ireland; Kosovo; Republic of North Macedonia) found that preferences for ingroup symbols mediated the link from child age to outgroup prosociality. In other words, while there were differences in the total number of stickers given to an outgroup child, stronger ingroup preferences were linked with less prosociality towards the conflict-rival. A similar finding was replicated among 387 children in Israel (Shamoa-Nir et al., 2021). In this analysis, child age was related to greater ingroup symbol preference, which in turn linked to negative outgroup attitudes and then lower prosocial giving. In this analysis, the findings held across both majority (Jewish) and minority (Arab-Muslim) children. Taken together, both across contexts and across groups within a context, we find support for age-related ingroup preferences for understanding prosocial giving across group lines.


## Empathy

The *Helping Kids!* Lab conducted a series of studies extending Batson's seminal work on the empathy-attitudes-action model (Batson et al., 1997). The model outlines how empathy for an outgroup member, specifically a stigmatised group (e.g., drug addict), may generalise to more positive attitudes towards the group as a whole. Moreover, those positive attitudes would mediate a link to prosocial action on behalf of the outgroup. The *Helping Kids!* Lab adapted this model for children, and more specifically, the focus was on individual actors directing different types of action towards victimised groups (e.g., both refugees and conflict rivals). Across these studies, we varied both the operationalisation of empathy (e.g., trait vs state; general vs outgroup-specific; see O'Driscoll et al., 2021; Taylor et al., 2022) as well as the methodological approach (e.g., experimental, cross-

sectional, longitudinal). For example, we developed a storybook intervention which aimed to enhance host-society children's attitudes and prosociality towards recently arrived refugee children (Glen et al., 2020). In Taylor and Glen (2020), we tested how the use of this storybook, as compared to an information-only control group, would affect empathy, outgroup attitudes, and three types of prosociality among 94 children in Northern Ireland, a setting of protracted conflict. Compared to those in the information-only condition, children in the storybook condition reported higher empathy towards refugees as well as helping intentions towards a (fictional) refugee that was told they would be moving to their school. In addition, children who had higher outgroup attitudes, on average, also reported greater helping intentions towards the (fictional) refugee who was the protagonist in the storybook; however, they did not donate more to refugees in general when given the opportunity. In addition, in this study, the overall empathy-attitudes-action model was non-significant. These findings suggest that it may be possible to enhance individual allyship towards an individual victim, in this case, a refugee child, but the short intervention was not effective at motivating broader forms of helping across a wider target group in middle childhood.

Extending this line of research, we found support for the empathy-attitudes-action model among adolescents in a two-wave study with a focus on refugees (Taylor & McKeown, 2021). More specifically, we included a trait measure of general empathy at Time 1 for 383 adolescents. Informed by the DPM (Taylor, 2020), we tested if earlier empathy related to three forms of prosociality, roughly mapping onto interpersonal, structural and cultural forms of constructive social change. In this model, we found that outgroup attitudes did mediate the link from empathy to outgroup helping (as well as collective action and political activism; see collective-level allyship below) among youth in Northern Ireland (Figure 2). More specifically, youth not only signed a United Nation's petition to stand #WithRefugees but also reported greater likelihood of taking part in a protest to support refugees in Belfast. The former behavioural measure further suggests a link between motivational factors for allyship at the individual level with those acts that can potentially pressure third-party actors to engage in broader forms of collective and societal allyship.

We also have found support for the empathy-attitudes-action model motivating individual allyship action among children, adolescents and young adults towards former conflict rivals. For example, across two studies (Study 1, correlational:  $N = 132$ ; Study 2, longitudinal design:  $N = 466$ ), we found that more positive attitudes towards the conflict-rival mediated the impact of trait empathy on both actual sharing and self-reported helping, comforting, and sharing towards the same outgroup in Northern Ireland



**Figure 2.** Structural equation bootstrapped mediation of the indirect effect of trait empathy at time 1 on three types of outgroup prosocial behavior aiming to benefits different levels of the social ecology ( $N = 383$ ). Control variables of adolescent gender, community background, and general prosocial behavior at time 1 are omitted for readability. Indirect effects are depicted with dashed lines and non-significant paths are depicted with dotted lines. Standardized coefficients reported. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

(Taylor, Dautel, et al., 2020). Relatedly, we found that, among young adults, the role of empathy in predicting prosociality was even stronger when the target in need was a conflict rival compared to an ingroup member (Taylor & Hanna, 2018). Using an experimental approach with 186 young adults in Northern Ireland, this research highlights the particular importance of empathy as a motivational factor when the outgroup is a conflict rival. This finding was extended in two studies using a dictator-style paradigm (Urbanska et al., 2019). First, amongst adolescents in Northern Ireland, those who reported higher empathy, on average, also perceived greater injustice in a scenario of inequality (Study 1:  $N = 466$ ). We followed up with a registered report (Study 2:  $N = 406$ ) and found that in the context of inequality, empathy shaped perceptions of fairness *through* facilitating the experience of anger on behalf of the *victim*. With implications for allyship, this finding suggests that empathy may not only have a direct effect, but also may enable perceiving a range of other emotions that further motivate allyship action on behalf of victims in the face of injustice or inequality.

### *Individual, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship*

Individuals act alone to undermine the perpetrator without expecting costs for their actions. This type of allyship focuses on the perpetrator with an aim to damage it in various ways such as boycotting/blacklisting the perpetrator's

services/products that are not needed for daily life or are easily replaced by alternatives. For example, individuals in third-party countries have stopped buying products imported from Russia and replaced these products with alternatives from other countries (e.g., Polish vodka). A previous study focused on the case of individual allies in Indonesia boycotting Israeli products (Awaludin et al., 2023). They found that allies were particularly motivated by perceived efficacy, rather than religiosity or consumer animosity (i.e., negative views of Israel), for these low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship actions.

Individuals might also sign petitions to request one's government to impose economic sanctions on the perpetrator group. Complementing online support for the victims, this type of allyship also includes signing petitions to punish the perpetrator for human rights violations via online platforms that give the option to sign anonymously.


### *Individual, high-cost, victim-directed allyship*

Individuals act alone to support the victim group, but invest a significant amount of resources, such as money or time, or risk negative personal consequences, such as loss of well-being, freedom or sometimes even their lives (see, e.g., Fleischmann, 2021). Allies can donate money or products (e.g., medicine, clothes, food), volunteer to assist the victims (e.g., sort donated products, provide accommodation), or even join the army of the victim group. Since the cost to show allyship may be higher for individuals within the perpetrator country, this might also include actions that seem low-cost at first sight. For example, signing an online petition publicly to support the victims may lead to social exclusion from ingroup members, financial (e.g., fines) or physical (e.g., force by police) punishment, or even imprisonment or execution in the perpetrator country.


In one study, Uluğ and colleagues (2023) focused on the individual allyship actions of the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel; People's Protection Units) supporters on social media ( $N$  of tweets = 550). Representing a variety of victim groups, the YPG played a significant role in fighting against the Islamic State as the perpetrator group in the context of the Syrian conflict. In this study, we focused on how identity content and social norms may be related to the YPG supporters' allyship actions on social media. We call these allyship actions high-cost because openly supporting the YPG, even on social media platforms, one might be charged with supporting terrorism in Turkey. The findings showed that the YPG identity is frequently associated with being a fighter, a hero and a martyr. Positive or even noble acts such as initiating a revolution, liberating oppressed groups, and resisting jihadism were also considered the norms of the YPG identity. These social norms brought both ingroup members and allies who identify themselves with the YPG on online platforms to become allies with people in Northern Syria as well as to advocate mobilisation for freedom and resistance for them.

### *Individual, high-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship*

Individuals act alone to undermine the perpetrator group, but their actions have high costs (e.g., being called “self-hating Jew” when criticising the Israeli government; Finlay, 2005). Moreover, in some intergroup conflict settings such as Turkey, individuals who protest against perpetrators’ wrongdoings and misinformation risk punishments such as fines or imprisonment. In one study, we asked our participants whether there were individual costs of becoming active as a part of a movement or a protest to challenge the status quo in their own setting (Odağ et al., 2023). We compared two different settings: (1) Germany as a non-conflict setting and (2) Turkey as a conflict setting. Although there were some overlaps between the costs involved in activism in both settings, in the conflict setting (i.e., Turkey), the costs were much differentiated (see Figures 3a and 3b). For example, in the non-conflict setting (i.e., Germany), the most strongly endorsed costs were time concerns (e.g., expenditure of effort, exhaustion, having no break), police interventions (e.g., fears of torture, prison, water cannons, and tear gas) and negative judgements from others (e.g., distrust, protection of privacy, social media bullying, knowing things about people, and isolation). In the conflict setting (i.e., Turkey), on the other hand, the most strongly endorsed costs were



**Figure 3a.** Perceived costs of activism in the sample from Germany. Shape sizes represent the number of times each perceived cost was mentioned by interviewees. The larger the shapes, the more often has the perceived cost been mentioned.



**Figure 3b.** Perceived costs of activism in the sample from Turkey. Shape sizes represent the number of times each perceived cost was mentioned by interviewees. The larger the shapes, the more often has the perceived cost been mentioned.

negative judgements from others and police interventions. Negative judgements included social media bullying, sanctions as a consequence of posting critical comments on social media, reactions from close others as well as stigma and social exclusion. The police intervention included death, facing teargas, plastic ammunition, water cannons, police sticks, weapons, gas bombs, tanks, torture, interrogation, police calls, and having to embark on a police car. Other risks, such as existential risks in Turkey, also included loss of employment, having to seek exile abroad, inability to find a state-owned job, salary reduction, workplace bullying, being kept away from school, and the impairment of regular life. In summary, although there were risks in both settings, risks were much differentiated and taking action to challenge the perpetrator group(s)' positions was more costly in a conflict setting like Turkey.

## Collective-level allyship

### *Collective, low-cost, victim-directed allyship*

Groups and collectives – individuals working together to reach a common goal – and organisations – such as NGOs and companies – often show their support for victims using relatively few resources and such actions are often symbolic. For example, organisations or companies might put the victim flag

on their website or in their building or display it at events like a soccer cup (e.g., pro-Ukraine messages on display in-stadium activities to promote peace; SkySports, 2022) or collect donations from clients or members to support the victim group. A good real-life example of this type of action was that at the Oscars, there was a moment of silence for Ukraine in combination with the appeal to support Ukraine as much as possible with donations for food, medical care, water, and emergency services (T. Johnson, 2022). In the next sections, we outline five important factors for this type of allyship action that we have found in our research: conflict narratives, intergroup contact, communication topics during contact, disidentification and perceived loyalty of the outgroup.

### Conflict narratives

One of the most critical factors that may affect allyship, especially in conflict settings, is the narratives people endorse regarding the conflict. In our previous work, we first identified five conflict narratives in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict setting (Uluğ, 2016, 2023a; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2016, 2019): (1) a *terrorism narrative* that describes the problem as stemming mainly from the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan; the armed wing of the Kurdish movement); (2) an *economic narrative* that describes the problem as stemming from economic backwardness and class-related differences in the Kurdish region; (3) a *democracy and Islam narrative* that describes the problem as stemming from Turkey's nation-state ideology which was based on Turkishness and excluded Kurds, and suggests an Islamic fellowship that brings Turks and Kurds together under a Muslim identity; (4) a *democracy and rights narrative* according to which the problem stems from a lack of implementation of democracy and denial of rights to the Kurds; and (5) an *independence narrative* that describes the problem as one based in need for independence for Kurds. After identifying those narratives, we categorised them as pro-Turkish vs pro-Kurdish narratives (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a): the terrorism and the economic narratives can be considered pro-Turkish narratives whereas the independence and, to a certain extent, the democracy and rights narratives can be considered pro-Kurdish narratives. The democracy and Islam narrative, finally, does not reflect a pro-Turkish or pro-Kurdish orientation and may be endorsed both by conservative religious Turks or Kurds.

In one correlational study, we collected data from Turkish participants as perpetrator group members (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a). We examined how Turks see the Turkish-Kurdish conflict would be related to their attitudes towards reconciliation and peace. Again, we categorised Turkish participants as potential allies (i.e., *çapulcu*-Turks) and non-allies to Kurds (i.e., non-*çapulcu*-Turks) based on whether they saw themselves as *çapulcu* in the Gezi

Park protests ( $N = 385$ ). We presented the participants with these five conflict narratives and asked to what extent they endorsed each conflict narrative. The findings showed that endorsement of the pro-Turkish terrorism narrative was related to more negative attitudes towards both reconciliation and the peace process, and the pro-Turkish economic narrative was related to more negative attitudes towards the peace process (but not towards reconciliation).

Conversely, endorsement of the democracy and rights narrative predicted more positive attitudes towards reconciliation in the two Turkish groups and more positive attitudes towards the peace process in all three groups. The endorsement of the independence narrative consistently predicted more negative attitudes towards reconciliation and more positive attitudes towards the peace process. One possible reason behind the differential relationships between endorsement of the pro-Turkish conflict narratives and negative attitudes towards reconciliation and the peace process is that the peace process addresses the problems related to the victim group (i.e., Kurds), their leader as well as their identity. This might be seen as a unilateral “giving in” and a more “confrontational” approach from the perpetrator’s perspective, whereas reconciliation explicitly requires constructing peace together in a bilateral manner (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a).

Another correlational study focused only on çapulcu-Turks and tested the role of terrorism and independence narratives in this potential ally group’s political solidarity with Kurds (i.e., ethnic victim group) and Alevis (i.e., religious victim group; Uluğ, 2023b;  $N = 295$ ). The same conflict narratives were presented to the participants, and later, political solidarity with two victim groups (i.e., Kurds and Alevis) was presented separately. More endorsement of the terrorism narrative (i.e., pro-Turkish conflict narrative) predicted less political solidarity with Kurds whereas more endorsement of the independence narrative (i.e., pro-Kurdish conflict narrative) predicted more political solidarity with Kurds. The results even showed that there is a positive relationship between standing in solidarity with one victim group (Kurds) and another victim group (Alevis).

After these studies, we also examined the moderating role of ally identity among perpetrator group members again in a conflict setting (i.e., Turkey; Uluğ & Uysal, 2023). We collected data from 271 self-identified Turkish participants and tested whether the paths between (a) ethnic identification and endorsement of the victim’s conflict narrative (i.e., independence narrative) and (b) endorsement of the victim group’s conflict narrative and support for minority rights would be moderated by ally identification (i.e., Turkish ally identification; Figure 4). We conceptualised a Turkish ally as someone who feels strong ties with Kurds, feels close to Kurds, and advocates for Kurdish rights. The results showed that the strength of the relationship

between (a) ethnic identification and endorsement of the victim group's conflict narrative is particularly strong among strong allies, whereas the strength of the relationship between (b) endorsement of the victim group's conflict narrative and support for minority rights is particularly strong among weak allies. Complementing the previous findings on conflict narratives, we also found that the more groups endorsed the victim group's conflict narrative, the more they supported pro-victim policies. These results suggest that allyship needs to be taken into account in conflict settings as it might affect people's support for the victim groups (e.g., pro-victim policies, behaviours, etc.) as well as their opposition to the perpetrator group's actions (e.g., criticising aggressive policies of the perpetrator group).


### *Intergroup contact and communication topics*

Intergroup contact may motivate perpetrator group members to see the conflict from the perspective of the victim and support peace-related outcomes that benefit the victim group in conflict settings (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a). We collected data from 385 Turkish participants in Turkey and, as mentioned earlier, asked a question to categorise them as potential allies (i.e., *çapulcu*-Turks)<sup>1</sup> and non-allies to Kurds (i.e., non-*çapulcu*-Turks) based on whether they saw themselves as a *çapulcu* in the recent Gezi Park protests (Uluğ & Acar, 2019). We later measured their contact quality with Kurds, endorsement of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict narratives, as well as their attitudes towards reconciliation and peace. We found that among non-*çapulcu*-Turks (i.e., non-allies), higher-quality contact with Kurds was associated with greater support for reconciliation and the peace process, but unrelated to any conflict narratives. At the same time, for *çapulcu*-Turks (i.e., potential allies), contact with Kurds was associated with lower endorsement of pro-Turkish narratives (the terrorism and economic narratives), and higher endorsement of the pro-Kurdish independence narrative as well as more positive attitudes towards reconciliation and the peace process through its association with these narratives. On the one hand, we argue that contact may have little impact on perpetrator group members' broader understanding of the conflict and may not lead them to endorse victim-supporting conflict narratives. On the other hand, contact may have this effect on a subset of the perpetrator group that feels excluded in society (i.e., [potential] allies to the victim group).

We also provided empirical tests of the role of intergroup contact in allyship by focusing on low-cost actions towards victimised groups (e.g.,

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<sup>1</sup>During the Gezi Park Protests in 2013 in Turkey, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan referred to the protesters as "a few *çapulcu*." It means looters in Turkish. However, the protestors took the term and redefined it positively as someone who fights for their democratic rights (Uluğ & Acar, 2019).




**Figure 4.** Path diagram of the theoretical Model among perpetrator group members.

racial and ethnic minorities) such as willingness to engage in collective action for racial or ethnic justice. We examined what occurs during the contact that may encourage members of perpetrator groups to become willing to engage in collective action in solidarity with members of victim groups (Tropp et al., 2021). In two correlational studies, we collected data from perpetrator groups in non-conflict (White Americans in the US; Study 1) and conflict settings (Turks in Turkey; Study 2) by asking questions assessing their contact with victim groups (Black people and Kurdish people, respectively). Participants were later asked how frequently they talk about group differences in power (e.g., racial/ethnic injustices in society, personal experiences with racial/ethnic discrimination, and the existence of racial/ethnic privilege) when they come into contact with Black/Kurdish people. In Study 2, we also asked participants how frequently they talk about group differences in culture (e.g., lifestyles, customs or cultural traditions) when they come into contact with Kurdish people. Our findings showed that greater contact with members of victim groups corresponds with perpetrators' greater willingness to engage in collective action in solidarity with the victim *through* the pathway of communication about group differences in power, but *not through* communication about group differences in culture (see Figure 5). These findings highlight the importance of not only having more general, everyday intergroup contact experiences, but also other meaningful experiences that might produce allyship among the perpetrator group (see also Hässler et al., 2021). We should also note that these two studies are particularly important because the second study in Turkey provides

evidence for allyship from a conflict setting, and we argue that some of the mechanisms that we observe in non-violent conflict settings (e.g., the US) may be generalisable to conflict settings.

### *Disidentification and perceived loyalty of the outgroup*

We proposed that political solidarity is a form of collective action in which allies can align their aspirational identities to the oppressed group's political loyalties through a process of *disidentification* from powerful outgroups (Chayinska et al., 2017). Adapting and extending the social identity model of helping and solidarity (Subašić et al., 2008), our research sought to examine the mechanisms behind rival Ukrainian solidarity campaigns advocating the protection of the minority Crimean Tatars in the immediate aftermath of Russia's 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula. More specifically, the focus was on the intentions to engage in collective action supporting the political and civil rights of Crimean Tatars on the self-definition in the face of the annexation among (both pro-EU and pro-Russia) Ukrainians, that is, citizens with the opposed political aspirations. In this research, disidentification was conceptualised as a politicised sense of standing against certain categories (i.e., "who we are *not* and what we stand *against*"; see also Chayinska & McGarty, 2021). In specific, we argued that contending parties within Ukraine (pro-European- and pro-Russia-minded individuals) used context-specific political claims (e.g., polarised views within Ukrainian society regarding Russia's annexation of Crimea) to encapsulate the commonalities between themselves and an oppressed minority and then assert political demands on behalf of that group in order to mobilise solidarity-based collective action. We found supportive evidence among Ukrainian citizens for the notion that both action (facilitation pathway) and inaction (inhibitory pathway) to support the Crimean Tatars were derived from disidentification from the European Union or the Russian-Federation-dominated Customs Union (CU) and were mediated by perception of the Crimean Tatars' loyalties towards Russia and Ukraine (Chayinska et al., 2017). In particular, it has been revealed that the more Ukrainians strongly opposed Russian Federation policies (by disidentifying from the CU), the more likely they perceived Crimean Tatars as loyal to Ukraine and, therefore, supported collective action to rescue Crimean Tatars from the annexation. Similarly, the more Ukrainians opposed connections to Western Europe (by disidentifying from the EU), the more they perceived Crimean Tatars as loyal to Russia and, as such, refraining from acting because they might not see the necessity to rescue this victim group within Ukraine. These results lend support to the core argument behind this research that political



**Figure 5.** Path diagram of the theoretical Model in study 2.

mobilisation of third parties in support of victims (i.e., an indigenous group with a history of oppression) often occurs when contending parties use political claims to encapsulate and symbolise the commonalities between themselves and a group presumed to be oppressed, articulate and assert political demands on behalf of that group, and mobilise a larger society for third-party allyship.

### *Collective, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship*

This type of allyship is shown by groups, collectives and organisations to undermine the perpetrator group, facing minimal costs (e.g., if a company or organisation signs a petition to punish the perpetrator group). This type of allyship also includes excluding teams of the group from (international) events or firing individuals of the perpetrator group (diaspora) with close ties to the perpetrator group's government. In one recent study, we focused exactly on this topic (Landmann et al., 2024): what predicts Germans' collective action intentions (and goals) to punish those responsible for the violent conflict (i.e., punishment goal) in the Ukraine-Russia conflict context? We collected data from German participants ( $N = 339$ ) and found that anger mediated the association between injustice appraisals (a belief that the situation is unjust) and collective action against Russia.

Similarly, in 2022, the annual Eurovision Song Contest excluded Russia from the competition (Watts, 2022), while the Munich Philharmonic fired its conductor due to his ties to the government and his refusal to speak against the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Connolly, 2022).<sup>2</sup> Another good example of

<sup>2</sup>We would like to clarify that we do not consider *allyship* actions in which individuals from the perpetrator group who do not support the perpetrators' agenda get discriminated against in any form.

low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship is the University College London Union's support for the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement (BDS, 2016).

### *Collective, high-cost, victim-directed allyship*

Collective allyship to support the victim group can also be of a high cost. These actions could be greater in scale (e.g., larger donations), but also could include coordinated efforts to support large numbers of victims. For example, funding and coordinating temporary civilian shelters inside Ukraine, such as Human Appeals's collaboration with the Ukrainian Muslim Women's League (Human Appeal, 2022). The costs of allyship may be higher if the collective is directly engaging with victims, such as refugee camps at the Ukraine-Poland border, because of the emotional toll and physical separation the collective's members must sustain. Depending on the context, these actions can be costly because allies can be physically injured, fined, or imprisoned.

Previous research in Israel/Palestine highlights the role of non-violent communication interventions (i.e., interventions that focus on increasing mutual understanding by talking about the situation without judgement, stating feelings and needs, and making clear and non-judgemental requests; Rosenberg, 2012) for allyship actions of the perpetrator group (Avichail et al., 2021). These interventions can impact Jewish Israelis' willingness to participate in allyship actions towards Palestinians (e.g., engagement in protests that improve Palestinians' living conditions or raising awareness about the living conditions of Palestinians among close relationships) by increasing their hope towards Palestinians.

### *Collective, high-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship*

This type of collective allyship to undermine or punish the perpetrator involves significant costs. For example, Coca-Cola and McDonald's suspended business in Russia, forgoing income from that market. The IT Army for Ukraine – hackers around the world who disrupt Russian government web services or power supplies – collectively invest a significant amount of time and risk revenge from the perpetrator government (Shore, 2022). This type of allyship action – hacktivism – is usually associated with socio-political motivations although thrill-seeking and increasing self-esteem may also play an important role (Romagna & Van den Hout, 2017). This type of allyship may specifically interfere with the perpetrator's war actions; for example, anti-war activists blocked the Polish-Belarus border to delay the transport of goods to Belarus and Russia (Sukhov, 2022). As a consequence, allies can face some costly consequences, including legal prosecution.

We conducted a study with perpetrator group members in Turkey to investigate how conflict narratives are related to actions that aim to challenge

the perpetrator group's policies and behaviours (Uluğ et al., 2021). First, a total of 110 self-identified Turkish participants completed the survey online (Uluğ et al., 2021). Participants were presented with the terrorism and independence conflict narratives (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a), competitive victimhood (Noor et al., 2008), support for non-violent conflict resolution (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a), forgiveness (Noor et al., 2008), support for stopping violence and support for aggressive policies. We found that stronger endorsement of the terrorism narrative predicted more competitive victimhood, more support for aggressive policies and less support for stopping violence, whereas stronger endorsement of the independence narrative was unrelated to competitive victimhood and most of the outcome variables (with the exception of support for non-violent conflict resolution; Figure 6). Among the perpetrator group members, the pro-Turkish conflict narrative seems to be a barrier to conflict resolution and peace-building efforts, but the pro-Kurdish conflict narrative may help them support non-violent conflict resolution. The results show that conflict narratives may play a crucial role not only in victim-directed allyship but also in perpetrator-directed allyship.

We argue that even demanding non-violent conflict resolution and challenging the perpetrator group might be classified as high-cost in some conflict settings. In Turkey, for example, Academics for Peace started a signature campaign to stop the Turkish government's crimes against Kurdish citizens in the context of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict (Uluğ & Acar, 2018). As a result of this allyship, some Academics for Peace in Turkey found themselves incarcerated on charges of purportedly aiding terrorism within a milieu of conflict, wherein vocal opposition to the perpetrator group incurred severe repercussions for those allies (e.g., some academics got fired from their jobs).

### **Societal-level allyship**

Unlike political science and international relations literature (Eznack, 2011), social-psychological literature on allyship has tended to ignore societal-level allyship as a unit of analysis. As presented above, most of our work also focused on individual- and collective-level allyship. In the following sections, we present a few studies on and other examples of societal-level allyship in conflict settings.


#### ***Societal, low-cost, victim-directed allyship***

Societal allyship includes actions by societal-level actors such as local and national authorities (e.g., political parties, governments) and supranational authorities (e.g., European Union), which usually take minimal effort to support the victim group. In our own research, although indirectly, we examined how societal-level allyship may bring about social change in a conflict setting. In Turkey (Acar & Uluğ, 2016), we interviewed 34 activists

who participated in the Gezi Park protests to understand their evaluation of activism, allyship and social change outcomes. The results showed that one of the many outcomes of the Gezi Park protests was the building of coalitions of leftist groups and a political party, which challenged the legitimacy of the AKP government to disrupt the status quo and gave hope to the opposition (see also Uluğ & Acar, 2018). However, the government responded with a backlash and implemented different restrictive measures, such as arresting any protesters or taking them into custody or even criminalising the newly founded political party. One may argue that the reason behind these restrictive measures was that the government felt threatened as the allyship was taken to the societal level and did not stay at the collective level.

Three years later, we interviewed 17 expert activists to understand the impact of societal-level allyship actions in the context of the Gezi Park protests (Uluğ & Acar, 2018). The findings highlighted that allyship actions included raising social awareness for certain groups (e.g., LGBTIs, Alevis) and uniting around new political platforms (e.g., a new political party; then Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP, which is an alliance of pro-Kurdish and left-wing political forces). These forces were also participants of Gezi and surpassed the 10% threshold necessary in general elections in 2015 to win seats in the new Parliament. The experts in our study indicated that both allyship and solidarity had a vast impact on HDP's surpassing the election threshold because people who demand peace and fundamental freedoms, without being interested in the Kurdish movement in particular, voted for HDP and challenged the system through societal-level allyship.

Although not being studied in social psychology, at the societal level, there are numerous real-life examples of low-cost victim-directed allyship in different conflict settings (e.g., more at the state level). For example, Australian and New Zealand governments condemn human rights abuses against ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang through



**Figure 6.** Path model for study 1; dashed lines indicate non-significant paths;  $***p < .001$ ,  $**p < .01$ .

official statements, and this exemplifies a low-cost victim-directed allyship. Similarly, local governments in Berlin, London, and Liverpool lit up public buildings in the yellow and blue of the Ukrainian flag, while both national governments and the European Union openly supported Ukraine through public statements on their websites. Furthermore, the European Council invited the Ukrainian president to discuss supportive actions at its political summit. Recently, Ireland, Norway, and Spain announced their decision to officially recognise a Palestinian state to show allyship (Time, 2024).

### *Societal, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship*

This type of societal allyship takes minimal effort to hinder perpetrators. Some diplomatic actions by different countries may fall under this type of allyship action. For example, various countries in the EU (e.g., Greece, Latvia, Czechia) have imposed a visa ban for Russian citizens in response to the conflict in Ukraine. Similarly, Israeli citizens being prohibited from entering some countries such as Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen is an example of low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship.

### *Societal, high-cost, victim-directed allyship*

Societies may be uniquely positioned to offer high-cost allyship to victims. For example, while some countries have provided costly financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine (e.g., foodstuffs, medicine, and clothing), others have provided military aid (e.g., tank deliveries), and the EU even considered granting Ukraine EU membership to make support easier. Another example of high-cost, victim-directed allyship is the U.S. government's aiding the YPG via air support during the ISIS siege of Kobani. Not only are these actions financially and time costly, but military support also may risk third parties becoming involved in the conflict. Research highlights the potential impact of this type of allyship action on other levels. For example, research in the US shows that when governments have alliances (i.e., societal allies) with victim groups (e.g., groups that get invaded by another country for territorial gains), this significantly can impact the public support (i.e., individual & collective allies) for military intervention in favour of the victim, regardless of whether this action is perceived as costly or not (Tomz & Weeks, 2021).

### *Societal, high-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship*

Societal allyship to hinder perpetrators may also bear high costs, such as imposing sanctions or expelling diplomats. One past example of this type of allyship is how Italy refused to accede to German demands for the deportation of Jews (Haaretz, 2019). Similar to Italy, Bulgaria was another country

that resisted the orders of Nazi Germany (Reicher et al., 2006). The success behind the Bulgarian case was a) category inclusion, in which Jews were treated as part of a common ingroup rather than a separate group, b) category norms which highlighted the core aspect of Bulgarian identity and c) category interest which emphasised that ingroup will be harmed if Jews are harmed (Reicher et al., 2006).

There are also some contemporary examples of this type of allyship. For example, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the US, UK, Canada, and the European Union announced new sanctions against Russia, excluded some Russian banks from the Swift financial network, and prevented Russia's central bank from deploying \$600 billion in reserves to help its economy. EU allies also expelled 200 Russian diplomats two days after the Bucha killings (The Guardian, 2022). Another example of a high-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship at the societal level is the US government's sanctions on China over human rights abuses of Uighurs (Madhani, 2021). These types of allyship actions may be particularly costly for those allies (e.g., a full boycott of Russian gas could devastate the European economy), as seen in the rising gas and oil prices globally in particular and in import prices in general (Guo et al., 2023).

## Discussion

### *Theoretical implications*

In the current contribution, we had three aims. First, we aimed to develop a multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in conflict settings by integrating collective action and conflict research (e.g., Moran & Taylor, 2021; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a; Uluğ & Uysal, 2023). In the typology, we distinguished the a) actors, b) targets, and c) types of allyship actions. Theoretically, the proposed typology can be generally utilised as a comprehensive framework to (1) clarify and refine the concept of allyship action, (2) map out the underlying dimensions, (3) enhance the accuracy of explanatory models by grounding the phenomenon in the intergroup realities characterised by a violent conflict, and (4) emphasise that allyship action should consider contextual constraints.

Second, we aimed to highlight what types of actions have been studied in violent conflict settings, especially from a social-psychological perspective. Illustrating the typology with examples mostly from our own research programmes as well as previous work and recent real-world examples helped us identify the gaps in the literature. For example, low-cost victim-directed allyship has been frequently studied both at the individual and collective levels in violent conflict settings. Individual, high-cost, both victim- and perpetrator-directed allyship has also been studied, but not as frequently as

low-cost victim-directed allyship (Odağ et al., 2023). However, high-cost victim- and perpetrator-directed allyship at the collective level has rarely been studied in conflict settings (Avichail et al., 2021; Hasan-Aslih et al., 2023). Our own review of this literature highlighted that there are especially gaps in research for a) low-cost perpetrator-directed allyship and b) high-cost victim-directed allyship at the *societal* level, as seen in Table 2. Therefore, more work is needed to understand the motivators, dynamics and processes of these types of allyship action in general (e.g., De Souza & Schmader, 2024) and in violent conflict settings at the societal level in particular.

Third, we aimed to show how allyship has been studied in conflict vs. non-conflict settings. In other words, our aim was to pinpoint both commonalities and differences between these two contexts. We argued that our typology generalises to contexts where 1) intergroup relations continue to be marred by differences in group status, 2) violence is pervasive, 3) asymmetrical power relations are maintained, and 4) non-state groups may also become a party to the conflict. Previous studies from non-conflict settings have shown how individual experiences (e.g., closeness to people targeted by prejudice and witnessing discrimination; Tropp & Uluğ, 2019; Uluğ & Tropp, 2021), emotions (e.g., anger, empathy; Chong & Mohr, 2020; Roden & Saleem, 2022; Selvanathan et al., 2018), morality (e.g., moral outrage and convictions; Green et al., 2023; Kende et al., 2017; van Zomeren et al., 2011), (dis-)identification processes (e.g., Craig et al., 2020; Iyer & Ryan, 2009), and beliefs and attitudes (e.g., zero-sum beliefs; Adra et al., 2020; Chan & Lam, 2023; Stefaniak et al., 2020; Uysal et al., 2022) may play a crucial role in allyship actions. Our own research showed some similarities between conflict and non-conflict settings in terms of predicting various forms of allyship actions. These were ethnic/national awareness (Bähr et al., 2021; Shamo-Nir et al., 2022; Taylor et al., 2021; Taylor, Dautel, et al., 2020; Tomovska Misoska et al., 2020), empathy (Glen et al., 2020; Taylor & Glen, 2020; Taylor & Hanna, 2018; Taylor & McKeown, 2021; Urbanska et al., 2019), and intergroup contact with victim groups (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a) as well as communication topics during intergroup contact situations (e.g., communication about group differences in power; Tropp et al., 2021). In addition to these similarities, we also indicated the similarities of costs of allyship actions across both conflict and non-conflict settings (Odağ et al., 2023). More specifically, these costs were police interventions (e.g., fears of torture, prison, water cannons, and tear gas) and negative judgements from others (e.g., distrust, protection of privacy, social media bullying, knowing things about people, and isolation).

Despite these similarities, other factors, variables and processes may be unique to or more prominent in violent intergroup conflict settings such as conflict narratives (Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017a; Uluğ et al., 2021), competitive

victimhood (Uluğ et al., 2021), victim group's political loyalties (Chayinska et al., 2017), preferences for ingroup symbols (Taylor et al., 2021), recency or intensity of violence (Bähr et al., 2021), and disidentification from powerful outgroups (Chayinska et al., 2017). We believe these conflict settings may bring victim vs perpetrator dynamics to the fore for allyship actions, and therefore, it is essential to unpack the target of such actions. Moreover, conflict settings can change and raise the costs of allyship action. For example, in Turkey, existential risks such as loss of employment, having to seek exile abroad, inability to find a state-owned job, salary reduction, workplace bullying, being kept away from school, and the impairment of regular life were more frequently reported (Odağ et al., 2023; see also Landmann et al., 2024). Costs may also be calculated differently compared to norms of fairness about the status quo in conflict settings (Corbett et al., 2023). Yet, time concerns, such as expenditure of effort and exhaustion, are also prominent in non-conflict settings (e.g., Germany). Even though we showed similar costs associated with activism and allyship action in both settings, taking action to challenge the perpetrator was more costly in conflict settings.

### **Practical implications**

Our typology also has practical implications. First, it proposes to distinguish actors at three different levels: a) individual, b) collective, and c) societal. It thus problematises the issue of allies' status and political power along with their potential resources and how those might influence the probability of achieving allies' goals. For example, the efficacy beliefs of individuals, compared to collectives and societies, may be quite different and shape which actions are considered effective (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Similarly, our suggestion to distinguish the actors by the levels of representation may also yield further practical discussion about plausible causal inferences among social movements. For example, the bottom-up approach that starts from the individual allyship may grow into a collective allyship and then, consequently, societal phenomenon, reflected in state-level policies or political actions or *vice versa* (Burrows et al., 2023; Uluğ & Cohrs, 2017b, 2017c). Our typology thus highlights the notion of the *plurality of peace* (e.g., Grabe, 2012; Palmiano Federer et al., 2019), suggesting that within conflict-affected communities, allies, at *all levels*, can direct their efforts at achieving different, often compatible goals, such as rescuing the victim group or hampering the perpetrator's aggression. Social movements that focus on improving the conditions of victim groups should pay particular attention to the type of allyship action.

Second, our typology underscores the importance of considering the target of allyship action (see Uluğ et al., 2024, for a discussion on the target of collective action; Taylor, 2020, for the target of peacebuilding). In

mainstream collective action research, the notion of the targeted action (i.e., either rescuing the disadvantaged or diminishing the offender), the idea of multi-target action and their operationalisation lacks conceptual clarity (for an exception, see De Souza & Schmader, 2024), which may affect social movements' target capacities. Our typology thus addresses this issue by bringing the target of allyship action to the forefront of analysis. We invite further discussions about how allyship action can be viewed as a multi-target phenomenon that requires a simultaneous alleviation of the multiplicity of causes, especially in violent conflict settings that are characterised by a complex, dynamic relationship between two or more rival groups.

Third, we differentiated between low- vs. high-cost allyship actions in conflict settings. Overall, low-cost actions usually take minimal effort, require less time, risk, or resources, and do not have serious consequences for the actor, whereas high-cost actions require higher motivation to confront the social, economic, and time-related costs or potential severe consequences such as injury, imprisonment, or even fatality (Carlo et al., 2022; Corcoran et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015). Although the typology distinguishes between different types of action, the cells and the examples we provided in those cells are not static or mutually exclusive. An action can be low-cost in one conflict setting and high-cost in another conflict setting. Given the fluidity and ever-changing nature of conflict settings, the cost of allyship actions can vary by context, actor, and timeframe with a given conflict (e.g., an action changing from low-cost to high-cost in the same conflict context). Moreover, depending on the actions that researchers or programme evaluators plan to analyse or compare (e.g., several high-cost allyship actions), it might be beneficial not to disaggregate costs into only two categories, but rather to conceptualise actions on a cost continuum. We also note that more costly actions are not necessarily more effective. For example, in the context of climate action (societal conflict), *Fridays for Future* has been far less costly (cost of time) than the actions of more radical groups (cost of time, physical injury, and fines; e.g., *Aufstand der letzten Generation*<sup>3</sup> is tying themselves on highways), yet seem more effective in generating public awareness, and pushing governments internationally to focus on environment-protecting policies (Fabel et al., 2022) compared to more radical movements that might decrease the support of the wider population for the issue (i.e., activist dilemma; Feinberg et al., 2020). Thus, our typology highlights how and why allyship action costs should be taken into account, especially by activists, allies and social movement organisers.

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<sup>3</sup>Rebellion of the last generation in German.

### Limitations and future directions

Despite an increase over the past decade (e.g., Kutlaca et al., 2020), research on the social psychology of allyship is still very much in its infancy. The research we present in this article, therefore, suffers from some important limitations that need to be addressed in future research. First, our research mostly relied on correlational research although there were a few exceptional experimental and longitudinal studies. However, we know little about how allyship is qualitatively understood by allies themselves and victim groups (for exceptions, see Momberg, 2017; Selvanathan et al., 2023), especially in violent conflict settings. More qualitative research is needed on allyship to unpack the motivations for and barriers to allyship in such settings.

Second, one might argue that some actions, such as waving a flag, may not be classified as allyship, but rather as solidarity, because it neither helps the victim group to gain a better position nor contributes to changing power inequalities between the victim and perpetrator (see Louis et al., 2019). However, these actions may raise awareness, which in turn might motivate allyship actions that challenge the status quo. We believe this is where the type of action comes into play and shows the importance of the intention for the action of the ally. Future studies may also add another dimension, such as the impact of actions on dismantling power differences, to better understand allyship dynamics in conflict settings (see Selvanathan et al., 2020 for a discussion). For example, do the actions intend to yield relational, cultural or societal change (Taylor, 2020)?

Third, our typology did not offer specific hypotheses for which motivations can correspond to which allyship actions and what kind of social change impacts these actions may have. For example, contextual factors might influence which forms of allyship are adopted in a particular conflict, and each type of allyship might have different impacts in terms of facilitating or achieving peace. Even though our research programmes have provided some insights into the allyship action that takes place at the individual or collective level (less so at the societal level) or that targets victim or perpetrator groups, we cannot speak to the motivators or impacts of each action we provided in the typology. Therefore, future research should provide empirical support for the motivators and outcomes of, for example, low-cost, perpetrator-directed allyship (3.1.2.) or high-cost, victim-directed allyship (3.2.1.) at the *societal* level in conflict settings.

Last, conflicts are often complex and multifaceted (Byrne & Senehi, 2009), as such, categories such as victim and perpetrator may be blurred. Distinguishing the target in symmetrical conflicts, where both parties have relatively equal degrees of power (Noor et al., 2017), is still important, but

might not fit neatly into victim- or perpetrator-directed actions. In addition, people may have motivations both to support victim groups but also to reduce perpetrator groups' power. Thus, future studies may also take the relative power of each group into account to study allyship in conflict settings.

## Conclusion

In summary, research has established that allyship takes place not only in democratic contexts, but also in non-democratic, authoritarian and violent conflict contexts. The findings we have reviewed in this article, mostly from our own research programmes, indicate that social psychology plays a vital role in understanding allyship actions both in non-conflict and conflict settings. To understand those actions, we provide a multi-dimensional typology of allyship action in violent conflict settings. This typology extends previous work by focusing on actors across three levels, the target of actions and the associated cost of allyship actions. We offer this typology to open new avenues for understanding allyship, solidarity-based collective action, and prosocial behaviour in settings of violent intergroup conflict.

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## Data availability statement

No new data were collected or analysed for this article. Therefore, links to the majority of the data discussed in depth can be found in the respective articles

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