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A longitudinal examination of the factors that facilitate and hinder support for conservative and progressive social movements

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Abstract

This paper examines social-psychological factors that can facilitate and hinder public support for conservative agendas over time. Using four waves of longitudinal panel data from Chile ($N = 2,394$), we estimated the between-person and within-person associations among individuals' self-reported conservative ideologies, political disaffection, civic behaviour, political attitudes towards democracy and social change, and their support for conservative (vs progressive) social movements over time. As expected, between-person increases in social dominance orientation (SDO), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), right-wing self-categorization, and political disaffection correlated positively with support for conservative social movements. Between-person increases in people's social change beliefs, support for democracy, and civic participation predicted less support for conservative social movements over time. Within-person increases in RWA and SDO correlated positively with conservative social movement support, whereas civic participation correlated negatively with it. Results provide novel evidence for the dynamic processes underlying support for conservative/progressive agendas.

KEYWORDS
Chile, collective action, conservative and progressive ideologies, longitudinal studies, social movement

1 | INTRODUCTION

The strife between progressive and conservative ideologies has become an intractable feature of contemporary politics. For instance, during the 2016 US presidential election campaign, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton defended the need for progressive policymaking by suggesting that the word "progress" is rooted in the idea of making things (and societies) better through political and economic equalization of social groups (e.g., Elving, 2016). This kind of progressive rhetoric is often opposed by conservative politicians who advocate

for traditional social arrangements and the maintenance of the status quo (e.g., Pettigrew, 2017). For instance, Hungary's right-wing prime minister, Viktor Orbán, recently said: "We must build a European democratic right that offers a home to European citizens who do not want migrants, who do not want multiculturalism, who have not descended into LGBTQ lunacy, who defend Europe's Christian traditions, who respect the sovereignty of nations, and who see their nations not as part of their past, but as part of their future" (Barber, 2021).

Ample evidence suggests that the strife between progressive and conservative ideologies manifests itself not only during national

elections (e.g., Schwalbe et al., 2020) but also in the unprecedented wave of public mobilization in defence of the contrasting visions of social change (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014; Khan et al., 2017; Major et al., 2018; Outten et al., 2012; Selvanathan et al., 2021). Indeed, the past decade has witnessed a global resurgence of social movements that advance polarized visions of the future.

As previous research has shown (e.g., Castells, 2015; González et al., 2020; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Kose, 2019; Pozzi et al., 2022; Thomas, & Louis, 2013), in many societies worldwide, *progressive social movements* seek to reduce social inequalities and injustices, restrain corporate power, protect the environment from anthropogenic climate change, and dismantle entrenched systems of inequalities (e.g., movements that support gender and LGBTQ rights, women's reproductive rights, immigration, decolonization, indigeneity, tax, and health-care reforms). Arguably, the unifying theme of progressive social movements is the need to redress the harmful effects of group-based social inequalities, oppose the negative externalities inflicted on the environment and society by industrial development, and challenge corporate influences on the democratic process.

Progressive social movements have often been contrasted with *conservative social movements*, which generally seek to promote and preserve historically inherited social arrangements (e.g., Federico & De Zavala, 2018; Jost et al., 2017; Mutz, 2018; Selvanathan et al., 2021). Examples of conservative social movements include anti-feminist and anti-abortion social movements (e.g., Freeman, 2020; Nelson et al., 1997; Swank, 2020) and anti-immigration protests (e.g., Larsen, 2007), as well as the mobilization of far-right militants and white supremacists who attempted to overturn former President Trump's defeat in the 2020 US presidential election (e.g., Kydd, 2021).

Despite the seeming increase in right-wing movements over the last decade, some political analysts speculate that public opinion may gradually shift away from conservative policies towards progressive policies over the next few decades (e.g., Colby & Ortman, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2017). There has, however, been little empirical evidence to support this notion. One potential reason for the lack of such evidence is the field's overreliance on cross-sectional and experimental designs that do not allow scholars to identify the role of specific individual and group processes that predict medium-term changes in behaviour outside a laboratory setting (see Uluǧ et al., 2022, for a similar argument). To the best of our knowledge, no research to date has examined both the *between-person* (i.e., average differences between individuals) and the *within-person* (i.e., temporary changes in an individual's level of a construct) variations in political ideologies, political attitudinal dispositions, and civic behaviours, as well as their longitudinal associations with shifts in public support for conservative (vs progressive) social movements over time. We thus seek to address this oversight in the current paper.

As a starting premise, social-psychological theories generally assume that individual-level processes such as one's affinity to political ideologies, social beliefs, and civic behaviours influence meso- and macro-level political processes (de la Sablonnière, 2017). These social-psychological variables display different value positions concerning the acceptance of social change and critically predict individuals' political behaviour. Building on previous research (e.g., Becker, 2020; Cohrs

& Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Osborne & Sibley, 2020; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), the purpose of the current paper was explicitly to examine whether between- and within-person increases in people's affinity with conservative political ideologies such as right versus left orientation, social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), as well as political disaffection, predict increases in support for conservative (vs progressive) social movements over time. Elaborating on the existing scholarship, we also sought to investigate whether between- and within-person increases in people's support for democratic rule (e.g., Catterberg, 2003), beliefs in social change (Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019; Thomas & Louis, 2013; Van Zomeren & Klandermans, 2011), and civic participation in the public sphere (Chayinska et al., 2021; Drury et al., 2012; González et al., 2020) predict less support for conservative social movements over time. In short, we argue that the second group of social-psychological factors can *hinder* the endurance of the conservative agenda.

In the current study, we conduct multilevel analyses of these indicators to examine the intraindividual variability in public support over time, as well as the intergroup processes underlying social change at large. Specifically, we sought to understand whether and how temporary departures from one's individual differences in the aforementioned factors (i.e., an annual change in political ideologies, social beliefs and civic behaviours) influence subsequent support for conservative social change. To examine the extent to which each of these factors predict changes in support for conservative (as opposed to progressive) social movements over time, we leverage data obtained from a four-wave longitudinal panel study conducted in Chile (Chilean Longitudinal Social Survey, ELSOC) by the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (COES).[1] We employ a rigorous multilevel analytical approach that allows us to explore the between- and within-person effects to identify and isolate social-psychological processes that predict changes in support for a conservative agenda over time. As we demonstrate, while previous cross-sectional and experimental studies have provided some important preliminary insights into the factors associated with support for conservative social movements (e.g., Harnish et al., 2017; Selvanathan et al., 2021), longitudinal studies are indispensable for assessing whether and how these factors can predict changes in public opinion that favour progressive social movements. In doing so, our goal is to identify micro-level factors that both facilitate and hinder support for conservative versus progressive social movements over time.

2 | RIGHT-LEANING IDEOLOGICAL PREDISPOSITIONS AS FACILITATORS OF INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE VERSUS PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Many scholars from myriad of disciplines concur that support for progressive versus conservative social movements is largely determined

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[1] The COES (www.coes.cl) is a multidisciplinary centre that aims to produce cutting-edge research on conflicts and social cohesion in Chile and the Latin American region, based on different conceptual and methodological contributions from the social sciences. The Longitudinal Social Study of Chile (ELSOC) is one of COES's research initiatives. It involves more than 40 researchers.

by people's relatively stable worldviews (e.g., Harnish et al., 2017; Ho & Kteily, 2020; Ho et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2009; Osborne et al., 2021; Pettigrew, 2017; van Dijk, 2006). One major difference between the competing ideologies centres around the concepts of equality and change: whereas conservatives are more resistant to change than progressives, progressives view equality as more important than do conservatives (for a summary, see Sterling et al., 2019).

Research in social psychology has extensively demonstrated that individuals' affinity with conservative ideologies correlate positively with favourable attitudes towards societal hierarchies. In particular, SDO, one's preference for inequality among social groups (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Stewart & Tran, 2018), correlates positively with support for policies that favour the inequitable distribution of power and resources including reduced foreign aid, fiscal conservatism, strict immigration control and severe punishments for criminals (e.g., Carvacho et al., 2013; Carvalho et al., 2021; Kteily et al., 2012; Kunst et al., 2017; Saeri et al., 2015; Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018). Similarly, research has shown that RWA, one's tendency to submit to authorities, act aggressively towards outgroups, and prefer traditional conventions, is a powerful predictor of status quo conservatism and prejudice towards outgroups (e.g., Asbrock et al., 2010; Choma et al., 2019; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Saeri et al., 2015; Weiner & Federico, 2017). Conversely, one's affinity with politically liberal, progressive ideologies (e.g., egalitarianism, feminism, and multiculturalism) correlates positively with support for various policies that aim to attenuate inequality between groups including providing foreign aid for developing countries, accepting immigrants and asylum seekers, and supporting workers' unions (e.g., Ho & Kteily, 2020; Kunst et al., 2017; McCright et al., 2016).

Much research demonstrates that left-right self-categorization is a major predictor of one's political behaviour (e.g., protesting, voting). Specifically, one's self-placement on the left is a strong predictor of the support for redistribution of resources (e.g., Becker, 2020; Jost et al., 2017), the liberalization of immigration (e.g., Larsen, 2007), and more aggressive measures against anthropogenic climate change (e.g., McCright et al., 2016). Conversely, one's self-placement on the right is associated with support for the traditional conservative appeal of maintaining entrenched social values, as well as a nostalgic return to the past (e.g., Becker, 2020; Jost et al., 2009; McCright et al., 2016; Osborne & Sibley, 2020).

Although political ideology is an important predictor of attitudes towards social change (e.g., see Jost et al., 2017), *politically disaffected individuals* (i.e., those who choose not to identify themselves with a political referent) may also support conservative social movements (e.g., van Wessel, 2010). According to Di Palma (1970), political disaffection can be defined as "the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism, and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians, and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime" (p. 30). Previous research has linked this disposition to various outcomes, including higher levels of voter abstention (e.g., Echabe, 2014), lower levels of identification with political parties (e.g., Bargsted & Maldonado, 2018), less social trust (e.g., Teymoori et al., 2017) and more cynical beliefs about politicians and political affairs (e.g., Blais et al., 2017). Yet few studies have systematically examined

the extent to which political disaffection precedes one's support for either conservative or progressive policies and respective social movements.

Based on the aforementioned scholarship, political disaffection should foster support for conservative (rather than progressive) social movements. This is because the politically disaffected should seek to reduce multiple uncertainties and threats that occur during social transformations by supporting social stability and the status quo. Individuals scoring high on political apathy and disaffection may thus perceive that a progressive agenda for social change risks worsening the state of affairs (e.g., Blais et al., 2017). We therefore expect people with higher levels of political disaffection (i.e., those who ideologically disidentify when asked about their right-left self-categorization) to exhibit more support for conservative social movements over time.

3 | SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL CHANGE BELIEFS, AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION AS INHIBITORS OF SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Psychological research has identified several attitudinal and behavioural factors that may vary depending on individual dispositions and the social context. These dynamics may, in turn, shift public opinion in favour of or against a more progressive social agenda. For example, the attitudinal and behavioural factors associated with incremental changes in public support for progressive movements include support for open and transparent democratic governance (e.g., Li Donni & Marino, 2020; Dryzek, 2002; Marino et al., 2020; Mcnutt & Pal, 2011; Stirling, 2007), beliefs about social change (e.g., Abrams & Grant, 2012; Grant, et al., 2017; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019) and civic participation in the public domain aimed at safeguarding or guaranteeing basic democratic principles such as freedom of expression, inclusiveness, and equality (e.g., Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021; de la Sablonnière, 2017).

Democracy is a system of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them, directly or indirectly, through a system of representation, usually involving periodically held free elections (e.g., Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Democratic governance not only advocates for the equitable distribution of opportunities but also allows for pluralistic civic participation in the public sphere (e.g., Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Uluğ et al., 2022). Support for democracy has been systematically studied in social psychology and allied disciplines by evaluating the preference for a democratic system as the best form of governance as compared to the preference for an authoritarian system or indifference towards a democratic one. It has been shown that one's preference for democracy over an authoritarian regime generally serves as a robust predictor of political behaviour such as voting and civic engagement. For instance, two international reports on Chile (i.e., the country in which the current study is based) revealed that around 60% of the population support democracy while the remainder are either indifferent (25%) or support an authoritarian system (15%; Corporación Latinobarometro, 2020;

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2015). Notably, these preferences vary by political orientation. For instance, compared to left-wingers, individuals who identify with a right or centre-right ideology tend to exhibit less preference for democracy. Instead, they consistently prefer a strong-handed, autocratic approach to political and economic modernization (Corporación Latinobarometro, 2020; Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 2019).

Along the same lines, citizens with greater democratic convictions have greater chances of becoming involved in progressive political actions such as signing a petition, attending a lawful demonstration, joining a strike, joining a boycott, and/or occupying buildings. The pattern of association between democratic convictions and civic engagement emerges across Latin America, as well as Eastern and Western Europe (Catterberg, 2003). Accordingly, we expect that individuals who support democracy (vs authoritarian regimes) will be less likely to support conservative social movements over time. We further expect that people who express indifference towards either democratic or authoritarian regimes will be unsure about the social change agenda—progressive or conservative—for which they stand.

Finally, whereas a conservative ideology typically resists change in social structures, a progressive ideology generally posits that, in order to improve itself, a society must be open to transformations (e.g., Darling & Nordenbo, 2008; White, 2018). Thus, another crucial social-psychological factor associated with support for progressive change may involve individuals' social change beliefs. Social change beliefs refer to people's shared perceptions of social structure as malleable and actor-contingent (e.g., Abrams & Grant, 2012; Grant et al., 2017; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019). Social structures create established norms that define accepted behaviour, complex rule systems, and deeply held common knowledge that enable interactions among people within societies. Converging evidence thus suggests that individuals will be more likely to support progressive social movements to the extent that they express openness to societal change (e.g., Buchan et al., 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Tausch et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2012) and believe that social change is possible (e.g., Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019; Thomas & Louis, 2013; Van Zomeren & Klandermans, 2011).

4 | THE CURRENT STUDY

Placing a particular emphasis on between-person and within-person variations in self-reported ideologies, political attitudes towards democracy and social change, and civic behaviour, we sought to identify the factors that facilitate and hinder support for conservative versus progressive social movements over time. In doing so, we focused on two broad groups of individual-level variables: (1) mainstream right-leaning political ideologies (namely, right/left orientations, SDO, RWA, and political disaffection) and (2) political attitudinal dispositions (namely, social change beliefs, support for a democratic versus an authoritarian regime, and civic participation in demonstrations). Theoretically, between-person and within-person increases in peo-

ple's affinity with conservative political ideologies (e.g., SDO, RWA, right-wing self-categorization) and political disaffection should correlate positively with support for conservative social movements that advocate for the preservation of the traditional social arrangements (e.g., Becker, 2020; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Osborne et al., 2019; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Conversely, between- and within-person increases in people's social change beliefs, support for democracy and civic participation should be associated with less support for conservative social movements over time.

The current study was conducted in Chile, a Latin American country that continues to experience political transformation through demonstrations and social protests (Chayinska et al., 2021; Contreras et al., 2016; González & Le Foulon Morán, 2020; González et al., 2020; Smith et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2021). During the time of data collection (2016–2019), several social movements echoed the concerns of left-leaning voters such as inequality, educational reform, indigenous rights, the need to overturn conservative economic policies, and gender emancipation (e.g., Smith et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2021; Somma et al., 2020). The social mobilization of left-leaning grassroots organizations opposed the policies of the conservative government led by President Sebastián Piñera. Piñera, a right-wing president, was elected to office in the 2017 general election by defeating his socialist opponent, Alejandro Guillier, and succeeding the centre-left government of Michelle Bachelet (Guardian, 2017). A growing dissatisfaction with economic reforms, led by President Pinera's conservative government, resulted in widespread social unrest, known as the 2019–2020 Chile Despertó social movement (Spanish: "Chile woke up"). The movement was started by a Chilean left-leaning student social organizations in mid-October 2019 in response to changes to public transportation costs and escalated into a nationwide social movement that brought millions of people to the streets to oppose the increased cost of living, corruption, privatization, and social inequality prevalent in the country (e.g., Larsson, 2019; Pozzi et al., 2022).

Crucially, Chilean society has long debated the need to reform the conservative dictatorship-era Supreme law by including constitutional amendments concerned with progressive issues including women's rights, environmental protection, and indigeneity (Bonnefoy, 2020). Hence, the data collection coincided with an historical period in which Chilean society experienced major political upheaval (González et al., 2016; Somma et al., 2020). This upheaval was seemingly caused by a long-standing clash between progressive and conservative values in Chile.

5 | METHOD

5.1 | Participants

Data for the current study come from the Longitudinal Social Study of Chile (ELSOC), an annual survey conducted by the Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies (2020). The study was approved by the research ethics committee of *Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile* and was comprised of a nationally representative sample of 2,927 adults

aged 18–75 (60.27% females; M_{age} [Average age] = 46.10, SD = 15.28). Participants were surveyed annually in 2016 (Time 1), 2017 (Time 2), 2018 (Time 3), and 2019 (Time 4). The baseline sample (Time 1) included 2,927 participants (39.7% male, 60.3% female), whereas Time 4 included 2,153 participants (37.5% male, 62.5% female). The retention rate from Time 1 to Time 4 was conveniently high (i.e., retention = 73.5%). The full sample, data for the current study focuses on the 2,414 participants who provided partial or complete responses to at least two of the four survey waves.

Using four waves of ELSOC data entails several benefits. In addition to increased statistical power, estimating the between-person effects over a longer time frame (i.e., four years) allows us to obtain an arguably more accurate estimate of the stable between-person differences in our focal constructs. Indeed, if we only used two waves of data, the between-person effects could be unduly influenced by an atypical assessment. Likewise, the within-person estimates capture variation over a longer time span, which entails more contextual variations associated with events that occur across time (e.g., presidential changes, changes to the salience of the social movement, developmental changes within the respondent, etc.). As such, the within-person portion of the variance in the dependent variable contains more contextual variability across the years.

5.2 | Procedure

Using a four-stage probabilistic stratified sampling framework, 40 cities from urban areas were randomly selected from 92 different municipalities spread across 13 regions of Chile. Within these cities, 1,067 blocks were chosen at random. Households within these blocks were then randomly selected, and an individual over the age of 18 was chosen randomly from each household. All participation was voluntary, with participants providing written consent. In each wave, participants completed a face-to-face 55-minute survey in their own homes, facilitated by a trained interviewer who was outsourced from an external organization. At the end of the survey, respondents were debriefed and thanked for their participation. Respondents received a monetary incentive equivalent to 9 USD for their involvement in each wave of data collection. Data collection was conducted by a well known specialized agency in Chile.

5.3 | Measures

5.3.1 | Political ideology

Political ideology was assessed using respondents' self-placement on a 0 (left) to 10 (right) scale. This variable is recoded such that the values from 0 to 4 indicated an affinity with a left-leaning ideology; 5 as centre or ideologically moderate, and the values ranging from 6 to 10 indicated an affinity with a right-leaning ideology. To identify participants who are "not politically identified", we also created a dummy variable indicating people who responded "Independent", "none", "I do not

know", or "prefer not to answer". Consequently, our political ideology variable has a total of four categories.[2]

5.3.2 | Right-wing authoritarianism

Four items adapted from Duckitt and Sibley (2007) were used to measure respondents' level of RWA. These items were: "Instead of so much concern for people's rights, what this country needs is a strong government", "What our country needs is a strong leader with the determination to lead us down the right path", "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn" and "The real keys to a good life are obedience and discipline." Responses were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 5 (*completely agree*). These four items were averaged, and the resulting scale demonstrated adequate reliability for each wave: Cronbach's alpha = 0.81 (Time 1), 0.81 (Time 2), 0.86 (Time 3) and 0.84 (Time 4).

5.3.3 | Social dominance orientation

Two items adapted from Kteily et al. (2012) were used to measure the egalitarianism dimension of the SDO scale. These items were: "We should work to give all groups an equal opportunity to succeed (reverse)" and "We should make every effort to level the playing field for different groups (reverse)." Responses were rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). These two items were averaged for each wave: Pearson's r = 0.54 (Time 1), 0.57 (Time 2), 0.64 (Time 3) and 0.59 (Time 4).

5.3.4 | Support for democracy as opposed to authoritarian rule

Respondents were asked to choose which of the following statements they most agreed with. These options were: "Under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime might be preferable to a democracy", "Democracy is always preferable to other political regimes" and "For people like us, it doesn't matter whether the regime is democratic" (the indifferent option). We then created two dummy-coded variables capturing support for democracy and indifference. Support for authoritarian regimes was used as the referent group.

5.3.5 | Beliefs in social change

The following item adopted from Jiménez-Moya et al. (2019) was used to assess respondents' belief in social change: "I believe that social

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[2] Excluding respondents who chose not to identify with any value on the left-right spectrum would have substantially reduced the sample size of the current study (see Table 1, for descriptive statistics). The identification of these respondents and their inclusion in our analysis allowed us to test the link between political disaffection and public support for conservative social movements.

change is possible." Responses were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree).

5.3.6 | Participation in demonstrations

Respondents were asked to indicate how often they attended a political march or demonstration during the last 12 months using a 1 (never) to 5 (very often) scale.

5.3.7 | Support for conservative and progressive social movements (the main dependent measure)

Participants were first given a list of social movements and asked to select which one they valued the most. Seven movements (i.e., student-related, labour, environmentalist, indigenous rights, pro-sexual diversity, pro-life or anti-abortion, or anti-delinquency movements) were listed, with an additional option to specify an unlisted movement. Participants were also given an option to choose "none of the above". Two additional movements were offered at Time 3 (i.e., feminist movements and movements supporting the reform of the Chilean pension system), and one more social movement at Time 4 (i.e., support for the demands of October 2019 anti-system social movement, known internationally as Chile Despertó). This variable was then recoded to express support for (1) progressive (i.e., student-related, labour, environmentalist, indigenous rights, sexual diversity, feminist, reform of the pension system and October 2019 movement) and (2) conservative (i.e., pro-life/anti-abortion and anti-delinquency movements) social movements.

The classification of social movements was made based on the existing research, which distinguishes between the two main types of social movements that either seek to reduce social inequalities and protect the environment (i.e., progressive; e.g., Castells, 2015; González et al., 2022; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Kose, 2019; Thomas & Louis, 2013; Pozzi et al., 2022) or preserve historically inherited social arrangements (e.g., Federico & De Zavala, 2018; Mutz, 2018; Selvanathan et al., 2021). For the multilevel regression analyses reported in the results section, this variable was recoded as 0 (progressive) and 1 (conservative), thereby excluding participants who opted for none of the above. This coding scheme allowed us to include collective action movements that emerged at the time of data collection.

5.3.8 | Sociodemographic variables

This section of the survey included participants' self-reported gender (male and female), education level in years, age (18–29; 30–49; 50–64; 65 or more), religion (Catholic, evangelical, other and non-religious) and income quintiles, where the first quintile (Q1) was the 20% with the lowest income and the fifth quintile (Q5) was the 20% with the highest income. Income quintiles were entered into the models as dummy variables. To retain participants who failed to report their income, we created an additional dummy variable indicating people who did not

report their income level (QNA). Consequently, our income variable had a total of six categories. We included these socio-demographic measures as statistical controls in our data analysis.

5.4 | Analytical strategy

Using panel data from the Chilean Longitudinal Social Study (Center for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies, 2020), we estimated longitudinal multilevel logit models (Singer & Willett, 2003; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to examine the extent to which conservative ideological predispositions, political attitudes towards democracy and beliefs about social change, as well as civic engagement variables, predict support for conservative versus progressive social movements over time. We analysed these data using R and the packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) and GLMMadaptive (Rizopoulos, 2022).

In a series of longitudinal multilevel logit models, we examined both between-person and within-person effects of the several predictors included in our regression models to predict support for conservative movements (e.g., Enders & Tofighi, 2007). In the context of panel data, within-person effects capture how changes in individual-level variables between waves are associated with support for conservative versus progressive social movements. Between-person effects, by contrast, examine differences between individuals, thus explaining the association between the long-term (or average) values of ideological orientations, political attitudes, social change beliefs and civic participation variables and average levels of support for conservative versus progressive social movements. To capture the within-person effects of these factors, we group-mean centred these variables where a group refers to the individual (i.e., observations are nested within respondents). The between-person effects, in turn, are captured through the individual-level average of each variable based on the longitudinal panel data spanning four waves.

A key issue regarding longitudinal multilevel modelling is how to specify time. To address this issue, we estimated four simple models with varying specifications of time (see Table 2). The first model represents a simple null model, which allows variance decomposition of support for conservative social movements. Model 2 includes a linear time predictor, while Model 3 releases the slope of the linear time trend and allows each respondent to have their own specific coefficient of time. Lastly, Model 4 includes time as three dummy variables, and thereby avoids the linearity assumption. This analytical strategy thus enables us to identify several factors (e.g., mainstream right-leaning political ideologies; political attitudinal dispositions and civic participation in demonstrations) that might be positively and negatively associated with changes in public support for conservative social movements over time, as well as to specify whether these processes are linear or not.

Finally, we estimated three multilevel regression models (see Table 3). We first consider a model that only includes the between-person estimates of the ideological orientations, political attitudes, societal change beliefs, and civic engagement factors predicting support for conservative versus progressive social movements. In

TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics

Variables	Scale	2016	2017	2018	2019
Support for conservative social movements	0–1	.34 (0.47)	.29 (0.46)	.22 (0.42)	.08 (0.27)
Right-wing authoritarianism	1–5	3.68 (0.81)	3.67 (0.85)	3.71 (0.88)	3.43 (0.97)
Social dominant orientation	1–5	2.00 (0.61)	2.05 (0.77)	1.91 (0.67)	1.80 (0.58)
Believe in social change	1–5	3.76 (0.85)	3.75 (0.88)	3.91 (0.83)	4.11 (0.74)
Participation in demonstrations	1–5	1.31 (0.78)	1.22 (0.64)	1.22 (0.64)	1.54 (1.02)
Education in years	0–19	11.49 (3.97)	11.29 (4.03)	11.56 (3.94)	11.44 (4.05)
Gender	Female	60.3%	61.5%	61.4%	62.5%
	Male	39.7%	38.5%	38.6%	37.5%
Income	Q1 very low income	19.1%	17%	19%	19.7%
	Q2 low income	19.1%	17%	19%	19.7%
	Q3 medium income	19.1%	17%	18.9%	19.6%
	Q4 high income	19%	17%	18.9%	19.6%
	Q5 very high income	19%	16.9%	18.9%	19.6%
	QNA income missing	4.7%	15.1%	5.2%	1.8%
Religion	Catholic	56%	55.9%	50.2%	51.8%
	Evangelical	18.4%	20.2%	18.9%	18.8%
	Others	11.6%	11.2%	13.6%	14.4%
	Non-religious	13.9%	12.7%	17.2%	15%
Political preference	Left	19.9%	19.9%	21.5%	21.8%
	Centre	20.6%	19%	25.4%	26.8%
	Right	14%	16.2%	19.6%	13.2%
	Without political identification	45.5%	44.9%	33.5%	38.2%
Support for democracy	Authoritarian	12%	13.5%	11.8%	8.6%
	Democrat	43.3%	46.1%	46.1%	58.9%
	Indifferent	44.8%	40.4%	42.1%	32.5%

the second model, we only estimate the within-person effects of the very same set of variables. Finally, our third model corresponds to our full specification, which includes both the between-person and within-person effects.[3]

6 | RESULTS

6.1 | Descriptive statistics

Means, SDs, and a frequency distribution of the dummy-coded variables are presented in Table 1. The analyses of descriptive statistics revealed that all measures varied according to their range and exhibited variability within and across the four waves of the study. Following Open Science practices, the data and scripts

used to perform the statistical analyses reported in the current manuscript are publicly available at OSF: https://osf.io/sdqc6/?view_only=d87857194fa8477686f86f7e08433b49 .

6.2 | Longitudinal multilevel models: Intra-class correlation and specification of time

Using a multilevel approach, four models were estimated (see Table 2). First, Model 1 decomposed the variation in respondents' support for conservative movement into its within- and between-person components. Using a latent variable approach (Rodriguez & Elo, 2003), the intra-class correlation was 0.28. This implies that 28% of the variation in respondents' answers corresponded to between-person variation, while 72% corresponded to within-person variation across assessment occasions. Consequently, there was more variation within individuals across time than between individuals. Second, whether specified as linear or non-linear, the models that included time predictors (Models 2–4 as opposed to Model 1, which constrained the effect of time to be zero, see Table 2) showed that the passage of time decreased respondents' support for conservative social movements. Interestingly, when

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[3] We also estimated the models displayed in Table 3 while controlling for sociodemographic variables (sex, age, education, income and religious identification). The results revealed that the effects of these covariates, with the exception of evangelical religious identification, were not statistically significant, and the size and significance of the estimated coefficients associated with our key predictors remained unchanged. We only report the estimated models without the control variables.

TABLE 2 Longitudinal multilevel models: intra-class correlation and specification of time when predicting support for conservative social movements

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coefficient (standard error)	p	Coefficient (standard error)	p	Coefficient (standard error)	p	Coefficient (standard error)	p
Constant	**−1.52** (0.05)	.00	−0.04 (0.09)	.63	0.07 (0.12)	.56	**−0.90** (0.07)	.00
Linear time trend (waves)		−.69	0.00 (0.04)	−.75	0.00 (0.06)			
Wave 2016								
Wave 2017							**−.32** (0.10)	0.00
Wave 2018							**−.94** (0.10)	0.00
Wave 2019							**−2.31** (0.13)	0.00
AIC	6,276.52		5,846.75		5,848.98		5,806.85	
BIC	6,289.91		5,866.83		5,882.45		5,840.31	
Log likelihood	−3,136.26		−2,920.38		−2,919.49		−2,898.43	
Num. obs.	5,957		5,957		5,957		5,957	
Num. of participants	2,414		2,414		2,414		2,414	
Var.: respondent (intercept)	1.31		1.91		1.29		1.95	
Var.: wave					0.01			
Cov.: respondent wave					0.12			

Note: Bold text indicates a statistically significant coefficient. Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are reported in brackets; AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion; BIC refers to Bayesian Information Criterion.

we evaluated whether a linear time trend was heterogenous across respondents by comparing Models 2 and 3, we found support for a homogenous trend ($\chi^2_{df=3} = 1.776$, $p = .41$). This implies that the decline in support for conservative movements applies to all individuals in a systematic and relatively homogenous manner. Finally, Model 4 performed slightly better than Models 2 and 3 on both information criteria (a reduction of both the AIC and BIC indices, see Table 2), suggesting that the optimal strategy was to include time dummy-coded fixed effects in the model. As these capture variations for the entire sample from one wave to the next, we refer to them, rather loosely, as period effects.

6.3 | Regressing support for conservative versus progressive social movement on ideological orientations, political attitudes, societal beliefs, and civic participation in demonstrations

As reported in Table 2 (Model 4), there was a systematic decline in support for conservative movements over the years (see also Table 3, particularly the increasing negative estimates for 2017, 2018, and 2019, respectively, in Models 1–3). Interestingly, the strength of the decline

in support for conservative movements increased as the years of the study passed, despite the inclusion of the between- and within-person estimates of respondents' ideological orientations, political attitudes, and civic participation indicators. This evidence reveals that the general population gradually increased its willingness to support progressive social change, which was already incubating, and which seemingly achieved its maximum expression in the social unrest that occurred in 2019, known as "Chile Despertó". This temporal trend enabled us to quantify large amounts of attitudinal change among respondents.

Consistent with our hypothesis about the role of political ideologies in fostering support for conservative versus progressive social movements, we found that the between-person estimates of respondents' affinity with a right-leaning versus left-leaning political ideology showed a strong and positive relationship with their long-term or average levels of support for conservative social movements. In other words, the more participants identified with a conservative right-wing ideology, the more likely they were to consistently express support for conservative movements over time—see Table 3, "right-wing" (centring at the grand mean, CGM) in Model 1 and 3. We also found that people's long-term affinity with a politically moderate/centrist ideology predicted higher support for conservative social movements when compared to people's affinity with a left-leaning ideology—see Table 3,

TABLE 3 Regressing support for conservative versus progressive social movement on time, sociodemographic, ideologies, attitudes towards democracy and social change, as well as civic participation on demonstrations

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Coefficient	Standard error	*p*-value	Coefficient	Standard error	*p*-value	Coefficient	Standard error	*p*-value
Constant	**−3.55**	(1.14)	.00	**−0.88**	(0.07)	.00	**−3.82**	(1.16)	.00
Time (referent = 2016)									
Wave 2017	**−0.30**	(0.09)	.00	**−0.31**	(0.10)	.00	**−0.30**	(0.10)	.00
Wave 2018	**−0.90**	(0.10)	.00	**−0.91**	(0.11)	.00	**−0.89**	(0.11)	.00
Wave 2019	**−2.29**	(0.13)	.00	**−2.18**	(0.13)	.00	**−2.16**	(0.13)	.00
Between-person estimates									
Political ideology (referent = left-wing (CGM))									
Centre (CGM)	**1.03**	(0.21)	.00				**1.04**	(0.22)	.00
Right-wing (CGM)	**1.54**	(0.21)	.00				**1.56**	(0.22)	.00
Without political identification (CGM)	**0.84**	(0.20)	.00				**0.84**	(0.20)	.00
Right-wing authoritarianism (CGM)	**0.36**	(0.09)	.00				**0.38**	(0.09)	.00
Social dominance orientation (CGM)	**0.26**	(0.13)	.04				**0.29**	(0.13)	.02
Attitudes towards democracy (referent = support for authoritarian regime (CGM))									
Support for democracy (CGM)	**−0.55**	(0.22)	.01				**−0.52**	(0.23)	.02
Indifferent to democracy (CGM)	**−0.78**	(0.23)	.00				**−0.76**	(0.24)	.00
Believe in social change (CGM)	**−0.20**	(0.10)	.03				**−0.20**	(0.10)	.03
Participation in demonstrations (CGM)	**−0.51**	(0.10)	.00				**−0.52**	(0.11)	.00
Within-person estimates									
Political ideology (referent = left-wing (CWC))									
Centre (CWC)				**0.33**	(0.16)	.03	**0.35**	(0.16)	.03
Right-wing (CWC)				**0.40**	(0.19)	.03	0.35	(0.19)	.07
Without political identification (CWC)				**0.34**	(0.16)	.02	**0.35**	(0.16)	.03
Right-wing authoritarianism (CWC)				**0.21**	(0.07)	.00	**0.26**	(0.07)	.00
Social dominant orientation (CWC)				0.04	(0.08)	.62	0.09	(0.08)	.27
Attitudes towards democracy (referent = support for authoritarian regime (CWC))									
Support for democracy (CWC)				**−0.42**	(0.15)	.00	**−0.34**	(0.15)	.02
Indifferent to Democracy (CWC)				**−0.31**	(0.16)	.04	−0.25	(0.15)	.09
Believe in social change (CWC)				**−0.18**	(0.06)	.00	**−0.20**	(0.06)	.00
Participation in demonstrations (CWC)				−0.09	(0.07)	.24	−0.14	(0.08)	.09
Var.: respondent (intercept)	1.35			1.80			1.41		
AIC	5,565.42			5,765.92			5,541.21		
BIC	5,646.46			5,846.97			5,674.36		
Log likelihood	−2,768.71			−2,868.96			−2,747.61		
Number of observations	5,957			5,957			5,957		
Number of respondents	2,414			2,414			2,414		

Note: Bold text indicates a statistically significant coefficient. CWC refers to centring within cluster (within-person effects); CGM refers to centring at the grand mean (between-person effects). Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are reported in brackets; AIC refers to Akaike Information Criterion; BIC refers to Bayesian Information Criterion.

"centre" (CGM) in Model 1 and 3. Importantly, between-person estimates of non-identification (or political disaffection) revealed that, as the consistency with which respondents reported to have no ideological position increased, so, too, did their long-term support for conservative versus progressive social movements—see Table 3, "without political identification" (CGM) in Model 1 and 3.

Consistent with our between-person estimates, the within-person coefficients revealed that individuals who moved away or changed from a left-wing political position towards the centre of the ideological spectrum between waves (or those who declined to express an ideological position during one wave) were more likely to increase their support for conservative movements during the same wave—see Table 3, "centre" (centring within cluster, CWC) and "without political identification" (CWC) effects in Models 2 and 3. Likewise, those who became more conservative over time also increased their support for conservative movements. However, when estimating both the between- and within-person effects simultaneously, only the former result remained significant—see right-wing political orientation (CGM) in Model 3 of Table 3.

We found that both the between- and the within-person estimates of RWA had significantly higher levels of support for conservative versus progressive social movements, which was also consistent with our predictions about the impact of authoritarian ideologies. Specifically, people who reported, on average, a higher degree of authoritarianism tended to express higher average levels of support for conservative movements—see Table 3, RWA (CGM) in Model 3. Likewise, respondents who expressed an increase in their levels of authoritarianism over the years expressed more support for conservative social movements—see Table 3, "right-wing authoritarianism" (CWC) in Model 3.

A similar pattern emerged when considering the role of SDO, albeit only with the between-person estimates. Individuals who exhibited higher average levels of SDO showed increased support for conservative movements over the years—see Table 3, "social dominance orientation" (CGM) in Model 3. No significant effects over time were detected when estimating the within-person estimates of SDO on support for conservative versus progressive social movements.

The between-person estimates revealed that respondents who preferred a democratic system of governance (as compared to those who favoured authoritarian rule) were less likely to support conservative versus progressive social movements over time—see Table 3, "support for democracy" (CGM) effect in Model 3—which was also consistent with our hypothesis. Contrary to our expectations, we found that indifference about endorsing either a democratic or an authoritarian regime was associated with less support for conservative social movements—see Table 3, "indifferent to democracy" (CGM) effect in Model 3. Conversely, the within-person estimates showed that support for conservative social movements declined only among respondents who shifted their preferences between waves from endorsing authoritarian regimes to favouring a democratic system of governance—see Table 3, "support for democracy" (CWC) effect in Model 3.

We also examined how beliefs about social change and civic participation in demonstrations predicted support for conservative ver-

sus progressive social movements. Consistent with our prediction, the between-person estimate revealed that the more participants endorsed beliefs about social change on average, the less they supported conservative movements in the long run—see Table 3, believe in social change (CGM) in Model 3. Likewise, the within-person estimate revealed that an increase in beliefs in social change over time was associated with a significant decline of support for conservative social movements—see Table 3, believe in social change (CGM) in Model 3.

Finally, the between-person estimates of participation in demonstrations indicated that the more frequent respondents' average participation in demonstrations was, the lower was their support for conservative versus progressive social movements over time —see Table 3, participation in demonstrations (CGM) in Model 3. In contrast, the within-person estimates were non-significant, indicating that temporal variation in the levels of protest participation did not alter support for conservative movements—see Table 3, the non-significant effect of participation in demonstrations (CWC) in Model 3.

7 | DISCUSSION

Despite the wealth of psychological research on mainstream ideological beliefs, political attitudes, and civic participation, research has yet to integrate these diverse approaches to predict medium-term changes in public support for conservative (vs progressive) political agendas of social change. Placing a particular emphasis on between-person and within-person variations in individuals' self-reported ideologies, political attitudes towards democracy and social change, as well as civic behaviour, our study aimed to identify the factors that facilitate and hinder support for conservative social movements over time. Accordingly, we conducted a multilevel analysis of four annual waves of longitudinal panel data from the Chilean Longitudinal Social Survey (Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y Cohesión Social, 2020). Situating our research in the socio-political context of Chile allowed us to both identify some context-relevant trends in the public opinion of Chilean adults and report the pattern of findings that can potentially be generalized to other contexts.

First and foremost, our results revealed a systematic decline in support for conservative movements in Chile in 2016–2019. In particular, the estimated period effects, captured by the dummy-coded variables for time, revealed that the general population in this Latin American country has gradually increased its willingness to support progressive social change. Notably, this rising level of support for progressive change was already incubating within the population and reached fruition in the social outbreak that occurred in 2019, known as "Chile Despertó". The observed trends in the longitudinal panel data clearly indicate that Chilean society, at large, gradually distanced itself from conservative social movements and began to embrace a more progressive agenda for social change (González et al., 2020; González & Le Foulon Morán, 2020; Pozzi et al., 2022; Somma et al., 2020).

Our research also demonstrates that the more individuals expressed a long-term affinity with conservative ideologies such as RWA, SDO, and a right-leaning ideological orientation (or increased

their affinity with these ideologies between waves), the more likely they were to support conservative social movements. Our research thus echoes past work showing that conservative ideologies (e.g., SDO and RWA) are associated with more favourable attitudes towards societal hierarchies, as well as higher levels of prejudice against dissimilar others, including members of historically marginalized groups (e.g., asylum seekers, Roma travellers, LGBTQ+ people), in a variety of settings (e.g., Asbrock et al., 2010; Carvalho et al., 2021; Choma et al., 2019; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Ho et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2009; Kunst et al., 2017; Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018). But in contrast with most previous research, our study also identifies the different social-psychological factors that foster support for conservative movements *over time*. Briefly, our analysis of between- and within-person associations revealed that people's ideological dispositions can change over time. Moreover, changes in these long-term propensities and short-term attitudinal adjustments reliably predict shifts in support for different types of social movements.

Another novel finding from our analyses is that between- and within-person variations in self-reported ideological orientation (i.e., individuals occupying a mainstream, rather than extreme, position) and political disidentification (i.e., individuals distancing themselves from the right-left ideological labels) increased support for a conservative rather than a progressive agenda of social change. Perhaps the most promising interpretation of these findings—and one that has some empirical evidence—is that conservative (relative to progressive) ideology is better suited to alleviate and reduce subjective feelings of threat, uncertainty and social discord because it promotes social stability and maintenance of the status quo, rather than rapid social change (e.g., Becker, 2020; Jost et al., 2017; Osborne & Sibley, 2020). Future research should further examine the causes of political disaffection and apathy because these individual dispositions seem to have far-reaching implications for the establishment of a conservative status quo.

As noted at the outset of this paper, one cause of people's political disaffection and disengagement is their declining trust in governments, representatives and political systems in general (e.g., Pettigrew, 2017; Teymoori et al., 2017). The tipping point in tackling a prevailing lack of trust may thus occur when governments and their representatives are no longer perceived by the public as competent and who deviate from shared moral standards of justice. Our findings therefore highlight the importance of examining the conditions that facilitate the support of political moderates for progressive policies, which advocate for political and economic equalization of social groups. Likewise, future research should examine the possible (mediating) mechanisms that sustain these robust within- and between-person associations between political disaffection and support for conservative movement.

Finally, we obtained consistent support for the idea that within- and (particularly) between-person variations in support for democracy as a form of governance, beliefs in social change and engagement in civic participation in the public sphere correlated positively with support for progressive as compared to conservative social movements over time. However, it is also possible that progressive social movements, like their conservative (or reactionary) counterparts, can pose a chal-

lenge to democracy to the extent that their supporters see violence as a viable strategy for demanding social change (e.g., Becker, 2020; Chayinska et al., 2017; Selvanathan et al., 2021). Future multilevel longitudinal research should therefore also shed light onto the micro- (i.e., individual) and macro-level (contextual) factors that radicalize progressive views. Indeed, it is important to understand what structural and psychological mechanisms propel a group of like-minded progressives to take violent collective action (see also Thomas et al., 2022; Uluğ et al., 2022).

In a democratic context such as Chile, preference for a democratic regime can be considered the default option. The expression of indifference about the regime might therefore be interpreted as one's vagueness about the utility of the available democratic rule rather than the preference for an authoritarian regime per se. Indeed, because conservative movements typically have strong ties to authoritarian attitudes and the status quo, it is reasonable to expect that people who are indifferent to the political regime might express less support for conservative movements relative to those who endorse authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless, additional studies are needed to clarify whether these associations emerge in other contexts.

To summarize, while ideological orientations, attitudes towards democracy and social change, and civic participation could be seen as independent variables in their own right, our research was among the first to illustrate how the constellation of these factors can act at both the within-person and between-person levels to predict change robustly in individuals' support for conservative versus progressive social movements over time. Although we obtained consistent support for our theoretical assumptions with respect to between- and within- person longitudinal associations, it is crucial to emphasise that our analyses were limited to data derived from self-report measures. Future research may benefit from replacing dummy-coded variables (e.g., left-right wing orientation) or single-item measures (e.g., social change beliefs) that we used in this study with continuous, multi-item validated scales. It is also crucial to supplement this type of analysis with more direct observations of the dynamics in public opinion that might occur during specific political events (e.g., elections, referendums).

Arguably, significant historic events such as the 2019 Chilean social unrest, the subsequent constitutional referendum in 2020 and the general presidential elections in 2021 (i.e., events that favoured the country's left-wing movements and parties) could further intensify both between- and within-person processes related to the decline in public support for conservative social movements. Hence, if measured at shorter time intervals (as recommended by Orth et al., 2021), it would be possible to establish sustained longitudinal effects. The ELSOC study used in this paper has annual time intervals, which is a common temporal distance in studies with similar characteristics such as the UK Houscholds Longitudinal Study or the German Socioeconomic Panel. This allows us to assess the temporal variation of stable traits (Hopwood et al., 2022), but is more limited in capturing rapid processes of change or the occurrence of specific events. Our within-person estimates capture variation over a longer time span, so it is less sensitive to

the specific moment of change that might occur at weekly or monthly intervals. This is a limitation to consider for future studies.[4]

Another limitation to the current study is that we neither conceptualized nor estimated the potentially bidirectional and recursive nature of between- and within-person associations between people's exposure to diverse social movements (including political rhetoric used to mobilize the public) and change in their ideological beliefs, political attitudes, and civic participation. Future research should address these important issues. Likewise, although we obtained an intriguing pattern of results in terms of how political disaffection and support for democracy respectively facilitate and undermine support for conservative social change, these constructs were measured as dummy variables in our models. Future research should see if our results replicate when considering the multidimensional nature of these variables.

8 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although changes in support for a conservative agenda constitute a key factor shaping contemporary politics, longitudinal research on the social-psychological factors associated with these change has been marked by a lack of comprehensive empirical examination. To address this concern, we estimated the annual between-person and within-person associations between individuals' self-reported conservative ideologies, political disaffection, civic behaviour, political attitudes towards democracy and social change, and their support for conservative (vs progressive) social movements over time. With respect to between-person associations, our results reveal that people's average affinity with conservative political ideologies (e.g., SDO, RWA, right-wing self-categorization), and political disaffection predicted higher average levels of support for conservative social movements. By contrast, between-person levels of social change beliefs, support for democracy and civic participation predicted less average support for conservative social movements over time.

The pattern of within-person longitudinal associations revealed similar, albeit slightly nuanced results. Namely, increases in individuals' affinity with moderate/centrist ideologies, support for authoritarian regimes and political disaffection over time predicted increased support for conservative social movements over time. Conversely, while beliefs in social change and support for democracy predicted lower support for conservative social movements over time, increasing levels of civil participation from one year to the next did not predict changes in support of conservative movements.

Crucially, democracy cannot be narrowly defined in ideological terms (i.e., democracy is neither conservative nor progressive). Democracy is essentially founded on the principles of the plurality of opinions and values. Future psychological research concerned with the mechanisms behind grassroots social change should therefore try to capi-

talize on the factors that can foster harmonious intergroup relations between people who hold opposing values with regards to conservative and progressive ideologies. Such factors may include (but are not to be limited to) descriptive social norms and social validation (e.g., González et al., 2020; Paluck & Shepherd, 2012; Smith et al., 2021), the promotion of inclusive social identities (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1998; McFarland et al., 2013) and intergroup contact (e.g., Meleady & Vermue, 2019; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Identifying reliable sociopsychological mechanisms through which ideological strife can be mitigated can further refine the development of appropriate public policies. Informed by the extensive published scholarship (including the findings from our own empirical research), we recommend that such public policies should prioritize (a) the promotion of active citizenship, and (b) the expansion of intergroup contact potential to normalize the diversity of opinions and tolerance towards dissimilar others in various settings. By taking a deliberate approach to building social cohesion where progressives and conservatives come to discover important commonalities, societies worldwide may learn how to peacefully coexist, embrace diversity, and overcome social inequalities.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data and scripts used to perform the statistical analyses reported in the current manuscript are publicly available at https://osf.io/sdqc6/?view_only=d87857194fa8477686f86f7e08433b49.

ETHICS STATEMENT

The study was conducted in accordance with the Ethical guidelines of the American Psychological Association (APA), and it was approved by the Research Ethics Committe of Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

TRANSPARENCY STATEMENT

All results are reported honestly, the studies were conducted ethically, and the submitted work is original. All data, variables, and codes are publicly available at https://osf.io/sdqc6/?view_only=d87857194fa8477686f86f7e08433b49.

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[4] The panel survey we employ entails an inter-university project including the involvement of more than 40 researchers from different disciplines. Consequently, important methodological decisions such as sample design, frequency of the interviews, and questionnaire content (among many other factors) may deviate slightly from the theoretical considerations of a specific study. We therefore unfortunately lack the ability to explore this issue.

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