A Coopetitive Game Model for Asymmetric R&D Alliances within a generalized “Reverse Deal”

The core argument in this paper is a coopetitive game model for the description of asymmetric R&D alliances (alliances between young small firms and large Multinational Enterprises firms for knowledge exploration and exploitation). Our model requires the adoption of a coopetitive framework, which considers both collaboration and competition, in the general quantitative setting constructed and conceived by David Carfi. We draw upon the literature on asymmetric R&D collaboration and coopetition to propose a new special mathematical model of coopetitive game, which is particularly suitable for exploring asymmetric R&D alliances. We model a specific case: the R&D strategies a big player (Large Firm, LF) has decided to adopt in an horizontal alliance with a smaller firm (Small Firm, SF). We assume that, to achieve its goals, LF, our first player, is forming horizontal alliances (that is, alliances between producers of the same good), instead of acquiring new scientific knowledge, with a small (but research-oriented and highly efficient) firm, our second player. The SF firm (II player) is engaged in the discovery, development, manufacture and marketing of highly technological good. To cope with global competitive pressures, LF is actively engaged in the so-called "reverse deal" (McKinsey, 2011), which consists in allying in triad with another mid-size or small-size firm (our SF) and with a venture capitalist (let us call VC or Cap), our fourth player (which we won’t consider one of our principal players, because of its elementary actions and simple payoffs) in order to spin out a new hightech development program into a new SF joint venture firm (we call RJV, research joint venture), our third player.