Inferential abilities and pragmatic deficits in subjects with Autism Spectrum Disorders

Subjects with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) usually show weak- nesses in inferential abilities. In this paper we try to interpret this deficit by using a new theoretical perspective. According to our study, pragmatic deficits of autistic subjects are linked to difficulties in integrating background knowledge in the context if they are not stored in visuospatial memory. First, we analysed some of the more recent methods to explore inferential abilities in subjects with ASD. After we hypothesize a deficit in the integration of linguistic background knowledge and an intact integration of visual information in the context and we try to interpret some empirical data in this perspective. Finally, we analyse two models of perception that differ just for the exclusion (direct social perception model) or inclusion (predictive model) of inferential abilities in perceptive processes. We found that more recent studies on inferential abilities of subjects with ASD are oriented towards a grounding ecological validity that includes various kinds of thought (and not only linguistic thought). Moreover, based on our hypothesis, we propose that physical causation inferences are – for subjects with ASD – easier than emotional inferences that are in turn easier than intentional inferences; based on the engagement of linguistic thought that the specific task requires. Finally, we sustained that if the predictive model of perception will be scientifically confirmed, we will have another reason to study perception to understand pragmatic deficits of subjects with ASD.