In this chapter, we propose a mathematical model describing a complex coopetitive interaction among different subjects of Pharmaceutical industry (partners or competitors), in order to determine possible suitable behaviors (actions) of the agents involved into that strategic interaction, from both the non-cooperative and cooperative points of view. Our work starts from a series of papers in which we deal with the same economic situation but from a simplified point of view. In this chapter we continue those researchers by adding more realistic features. Particularly, we apply again the complete analysis of a coopetitive differentiable game (see Carfì (2009c), Carfì and Ricciardello (2012a)). We desire to recall the history of our approach to that kind of problems. In Baglieri, Carfì and Dagnino (2016), we show how the use of D. Carfì new coopetitive game definition, which considers both collaboration and competition together and simultaneously, may advance the understanding and control of asymmetric R&D alliances, those between small (and/or young) firms and large (e.g. Multinational Enter-prises). There, we considered the literature on asymmetric R&D cooperation and coopetition to propose a particular linear mathematical model of coopetitive game, which seems particularly suitable for exploring certain types of asymmetric R&D alliances involving two pharmaceutical firms and a venture capitalist in the foundation and adoption of a coopetitive Joint Venture (third player of our game). In Carfì and Donato (2016), we present a meaningful economic generalization of the model presented in Baglieri, Carfì and Dagnino. (2016), with the introduction of two parameters (α and β) indicating what percentages of production is actually sold in the Market by first and third player respectively. So, we can consider scenarios in which we don't know how much of the good production will be bought by the Market and in which only a percentage of the total production is actually sold. In Carfì and Donato (2016) we studied a numerical case of Pharmaceutical R&D Alliances considering a fixed value of these percentages. Now, here we want to study the same game for all the values of the parameter α, in order to figure out the deep relevance of the variations of our parameter for the solutions of the coopetitive game and for the economical significance. So, it will be possible to evaluate, at the beginning of the game, the future gains of the players in the case of un-certain selling scenarios.

Partial selling in a coopetitive Alliance within Pharmaceutical industry: a complete study case

CARFI', David;Donato, Alessia
2016-01-01

Abstract

In this chapter, we propose a mathematical model describing a complex coopetitive interaction among different subjects of Pharmaceutical industry (partners or competitors), in order to determine possible suitable behaviors (actions) of the agents involved into that strategic interaction, from both the non-cooperative and cooperative points of view. Our work starts from a series of papers in which we deal with the same economic situation but from a simplified point of view. In this chapter we continue those researchers by adding more realistic features. Particularly, we apply again the complete analysis of a coopetitive differentiable game (see Carfì (2009c), Carfì and Ricciardello (2012a)). We desire to recall the history of our approach to that kind of problems. In Baglieri, Carfì and Dagnino (2016), we show how the use of D. Carfì new coopetitive game definition, which considers both collaboration and competition together and simultaneously, may advance the understanding and control of asymmetric R&D alliances, those between small (and/or young) firms and large (e.g. Multinational Enter-prises). There, we considered the literature on asymmetric R&D cooperation and coopetition to propose a particular linear mathematical model of coopetitive game, which seems particularly suitable for exploring certain types of asymmetric R&D alliances involving two pharmaceutical firms and a venture capitalist in the foundation and adoption of a coopetitive Joint Venture (third player of our game). In Carfì and Donato (2016), we present a meaningful economic generalization of the model presented in Baglieri, Carfì and Dagnino. (2016), with the introduction of two parameters (α and β) indicating what percentages of production is actually sold in the Market by first and third player respectively. So, we can consider scenarios in which we don't know how much of the good production will be bought by the Market and in which only a percentage of the total production is actually sold. In Carfì and Donato (2016) we studied a numerical case of Pharmaceutical R&D Alliances considering a fixed value of these percentages. Now, here we want to study the same game for all the values of the parameter α, in order to figure out the deep relevance of the variations of our parameter for the solutions of the coopetitive game and for the economical significance. So, it will be possible to evaluate, at the beginning of the game, the future gains of the players in the case of un-certain selling scenarios.
2016
9788825504446
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11570/3110209
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