Pronominals and presuppositions in that-clauses of indirect reports

In this paper, after outlining the general problem of the pragmatics of indirect reports, we dwell on two notoriously thorny problems: a) how do we interpret the pronominals contained in that-clauses of indirect reports; b) how do we interpret the presuppositions of that-clauses of indirect reports? (These two problems appear to us to be connected either through the specific nature of the solutions or through some general format of the problem). Theoretical considerations lead us in the direction of the idea that if two pragmatic principles clash, one should give way, but since we do not know which one has to give way, we should be prepared to accept that the strongest or highest-ranking principle will defeat (in the sense of temporarily suspending) the other (see Huang 2014). Here we encounter a Principle, which Capone (2006) brought our attention to, that is not usually discussed in pragmatic theories, but which seems to play a crucial role, at least sometimes