Motor simulation of facial expressions, but not emotional mirroring, depends on automatic sensorimotor abduction

Here it will be advanced the hypothesis that the ability to interact with the emotions displayed by co-specifics depends on two distinct simulationist systems, i.e., “motor simulation” and “emotional mirroring.” Although these systems are typically conceived as alternative and mutually exclusive models, the first aim of this chapter is to present empirical evidence demonstrating that they are coexisting systems that differ in terms of input, output, neural circuitry, and cognitive function. The former exploits motor knowledge to assist the visual system during the identification of potentially ambiguous emotional stimuli, while the latter conveys emotional contagion and social bonding. To clarify the functional difference between the two systems, it will be made reference to the notion of automatic abduction, as it has been originally described in the Peircean semiotic tradition. It will be argued that only “motor simulation” – but not “emotional mirroring” – can be thought of as part of an automatic sensorimotor abduction, that is, a sensorimotor inferential process which allows the exploitation of motor knowledge to assist the visual system during the identification of potentially ambiguous emotional stimuli. Instances of simulations triggered by “motor simulation” and “emotional mirroring” will be considered, respectively, in terms of motor and affective habits. The former will be characterized as ignorance-based kind of habits, whereas the latter will be defined as knowledge-based habits. Finally, the mechanism of “motor simulation” will be discussed in the light of the predictive processing framework.