The chapter aims to test the limits of criminal liability in the use of unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS”) in both military and civilian settings, from the perspective of the Italian legal system. The gradual introduction of intelligent systems instead of humans ends up blurring the objective and subjective link between the harmful or dangerous result and the human agent, undermining the legitimacy of using criminal law. However, today’s technological structure of UAS, which can (still) be classified as semi-automatic vehicles, makes it possible to confirm the current solidity of the penal categories without excessive strain, both in the case of the intentional use of drones for the commission of crimes and in the hypothesis of the use of such instruments in the exercise of lawful yet dangerous activities. Indeed, the use of UAS does not interrupt the risk connection between human conduct and criminally relevant consequent injury, nor does it interrupt the necessary psychological link. It is, if anything, a matter of keeping the focus on the expansion of centres of responsibility in cases of complex organisations involving the collective management of the risk associated with the lawful use of drones.
UAS and Criminal Law: An Analysis from the Perspective of the Italian Legal System
Giuseppina Panebianco
2025-01-01
Abstract
The chapter aims to test the limits of criminal liability in the use of unmanned aircraft systems (“UAS”) in both military and civilian settings, from the perspective of the Italian legal system. The gradual introduction of intelligent systems instead of humans ends up blurring the objective and subjective link between the harmful or dangerous result and the human agent, undermining the legitimacy of using criminal law. However, today’s technological structure of UAS, which can (still) be classified as semi-automatic vehicles, makes it possible to confirm the current solidity of the penal categories without excessive strain, both in the case of the intentional use of drones for the commission of crimes and in the hypothesis of the use of such instruments in the exercise of lawful yet dangerous activities. Indeed, the use of UAS does not interrupt the risk connection between human conduct and criminally relevant consequent injury, nor does it interrupt the necessary psychological link. It is, if anything, a matter of keeping the focus on the expansion of centres of responsibility in cases of complex organisations involving the collective management of the risk associated with the lawful use of drones.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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