Coopetitive Games and Greek crisis

In this paper we apply the model of coopetitive game (in the sense recently introduced by David Carfì) to Economic Policy and in particular to the crisis of the Eurozone (as already done in some published articles). We conduct a deep study of the particular model proposed, namely, for the analysis we conduct a complete study of the game - in the sense introduced and already applied by D. Carfì. The key points of our coopetitive exam are essentially the following ones: 1) the complete study of an initial game G(0), in the recalled sense, from which we obtain also a precise knowledge of its payoff space; 2) the study of a curve g of normal-form games with starting point the game G(0), by methodologies of essentially geometric nature; 3) the determination of the path of Nash equilibria (of the games forming the curve g) (that we will use to the selection of coopetitive Pareto strategies, see point 4); 4) the determination of the Pareto maximal boundary of the coopetitive game (that is the maximal boundary of the union of the payoff spaces of the games forming the curve g); 5) the determination of compromise solutions for our strategic interaction. From an applicative point of view, our aim is to improve the position of the whole Euro area, also making a contribution to expand the set of macroeconomic policy tools. By means of our general analytical framework of coopetitive game, we show the strategies that could bring to feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for the different country of the Euro zone (Germany and Greece in particular), where these feasible solutions aim at offering win-win outcomes for all countries in the EMU, letting them to share the pie fairly within a growth path represented by a non-zero sum coopetitive game. A remarkable analytical result of our work consists in the determination of a natural win-win solution by a new coopetitive selection method on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.