RIVOLUZIONE SOVRANITÀ LIBERTÀ L’aurora della modernità

The approximate (and ahistorical) imitation of the cultural and legal Anglo-American institutional model has provoked in Italy the introduction of amendments to the Constitution and to the electoral system, pushing, without succeeding, towards a two-party polarization that clashes with the tradition of plurality of our history. The opposition between civil law and common law refers to the comparison between two different systems, the first characterized by the presence of codes, the second essentially based on case law and doctrinal jurisprudence. Each of the two is not the product of abstract speculations of lawyers, but the consequence of concrete social processes and secular confrontations between well-defined classes and classes. While the condition of today's Europe -sfumati the nation-state boundaries and not yet defined a new political entity supernazionale- appears uncertain, to say the least precarious, the changes which, from the absolute state, led to the rule of law, they can provide an act paradigm to understand the real meaning of the attempt at political and institutional transformation. The book intends to propose a comparative analysis of the thought of some of the protagonists of the period which is between seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as an intrerpretaion key of constitutional doctrines and institutions produced in England during the sixteenth century, and in America during and after the Indipendence war, as well as and France during the Enlightenment season, resorting inescapable mirror the historian who, in reflecting on the past, see current images of the origins of power and its regulations joints. It is also underlined that the process of building the American Constitution with its acknowledgement of perople sovereignty and the exercise and protection of rights, has much to do with British jusrists and philosophers, particularly with Locke's docrine What stands out from a review of the original constitutions of the founding states is their repeated reliance on the principles of natural law and the widespread understanding that individuals are entitled by nature to enjoy of certain natural or inalienable rights. The Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 drafted the constitution of the United States based directly on natural rights, including life, liberty, property, happiness as theorized by John Locke. At the same time, the people had an inherent right to live under a republican government, and possessed an inalienable right to reform or abolish governments that failed to secure these rights, or ruled without the consent of the governed: the framers relied on the classical republicanism of James Harrington (1611-1677) which celebrated the ideals of virtuous citizenship in a republic. It is only in recent times that popular participation in constitution-making has been accommodated. Traditionally, as typified by the Constitutional Convention, attention is paid to the sovereignty of the people; if sovereignty is indeed vested in and flows from the people it is natural that they should determine how it should be delegated and exercised. From the Convention, key elements of the modern parliamentary system evolved to a more modern form of governmental system, a new constitutionalism. The idea that a written constitution spells out the supreme law of the land and sets limits on the ruling authorities has become the most significant element of American modernity. L’approssimativa (e antistorica) imitazione del modello culturale e giuridico-istituzionale anglo-americano ha condotto in Italia all’introduzione di modifiche della Costituzione e del sistema elettorale, spingendo, senza peraltro riuscirvi, verso una polarizzazione bipartitica che urta contro la tradizione di pluralità della nostra storia. La contrapposizione tra civil law e common law rimanda al confronto fra due diversi sistemi, il primo caratterizzato dalla presenza dei codici, il secondo essenzialmente fondato sul diritto giurisprudenziale. Ciascuno dei due non è il prodotto di astratte elucubrazioni di giuristi, ma la conseguenza di processi sociali concreti e di secolari scontri tra ceti e classi ben determinati. Mentre la condizione attuale dell’Europa -sfumati i contorni dello Stato-nazione e non ancora definito un nuovo soggetto politico supernazionale- appare incerta, per non dir precaria, i mutamenti che, a partire dallo Stato assoluto, hanno condotto allo Stato di diritto, possono fornire un paradigma atto a comprendere il senso reale dell’attuale tentativo di trasformazione politico-istituzionale. Il libro intende proporre una analisi comparata del pensiero di alcuni protagonisti del periodo che si colloca tra Sei e Settecento, come chiave di interpretazione delle dottrine costituzionali e delle istituzioni prodotte in Inghilterra a partire dal XVI secolo, in America durante e dopo la guerra d’Indipendenza e in Francia nel corso della grande stagione illuminista, ricorrendo all’ineludibile specchio dello storico che, nel riflettere il passato, rimanda immagini attuali delle origini del potere e delle sue articolazioni normative.