Globalization and differentiable general sum game

In this paper we apply the complete analysis of a differentiable game (recently introduced by the author) to the determination of possible suitable behaviours of individuals and economical systems during strategic interactions in a global economic environment, from both non-cooperative and cooperative point of view. For what concerns the complete analysis of a differentiable game, its first goal is the precise knowledge of the Pareto boundaries (maximal and minimal) of the payoff space; this knowledge will allow us to 1) evaluate the quality of the different Nash equilibria (by the distances from the Nash equilibria themselves to the Pareto boundaries, with respect to appropriate metrics), in order to determine some “focal” equilibrium points collectively more satisfactory than each other, in the sense of Myerson. 2) determine and evaluate the different compromise and bargaining solutions. We concentrate our attention on infinite differentiable general sum games, which are models greatly more adherent to the real globalized economic situation than the finite games or the zero sum games.