Risk Management of Climate Change: Coopetitive scenarios of Paris Agreement

In this paper, we propose a coopetitive model for the risk management of climate change effects, through a complex duopoly-type model, for a generic type of green technological good. Through our model, we suggest certain coopetitive strategy proles as solutions for a continuum of possible global scenarios, in the context of the Paris agreement COP21, after Trump's decision to abandon the agreement itself. More specically, we construct a game theory coopetitive model with two great actors, USA and the group of countries which still agree to COP21. The two actors of our duopoly game compete on the global market by producing and selling green technology goods (for example, electric cars, hydrogen cars, solar panels, low impact batteries for smart houses, electric cars or self phones, and so on). Our multi-dimensional coopetitive model suggests possible cooperative paradigms and strategies in order to improve the efficiency and strength of the actions enforced by the countries to mitigate the climate change catastrophic risk at the level of its causes and effects.