Plastic ocean reduction via green packaging coopetitive agreements

In our work, we present a coopetitive model of strategic interaction, based on perfect competition a la Cournot and aiming at plastic ocean reduction, among two fast foods and some innovative paper factories. In more specific terms, we define a suitable coopetitive game among similar large food producers/retailers, locally and globally competing on the same market, characterized by the principle aim of reducing plastic waste in the ocean. We consider innovative factories producing paper, cardboard and new green-effective packaging with low environmental impact. The factories produce innovative packaging using recycled paper and cardboard, containing minimal plastic parts (that can be easily separated by consumers and sent very quickly for recycling). We determine possible 'fair and plastic reducing coopetitive agreements', allowing the actors to increase the gains by diminishing production costs and environmental costs. Consequently, we suggest methods and quantitative proportions in order to tune the agreements towards zero plastic waste. We show a complete analysis of our proposed economic game and some of its possible solutions.