In this paper we develop a one shot electoral game where people who decide to run for offices have to present a program. We assume that voting decision depends on both program preferences and candidates' reputation. We will try to investigate whether and, eventually, how the number of candidates influences canddates' behaviour and, therefore, social welfare.
The theory of choice in the electoral game: how candidates' number may influence electoral equilibrium
SOBBRIO, Giuseppe;D'AGOSTINO, Elena
2006-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we develop a one shot electoral game where people who decide to run for offices have to present a program. We assume that voting decision depends on both program preferences and candidates' reputation. We will try to investigate whether and, eventually, how the number of candidates influences canddates' behaviour and, therefore, social welfare.File in questo prodotto:
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