Improving Welfare in Congo: Italian National Hydrocarbons Authority Strategies and its Possible Coopetitive Alliances with Green Energy Producers

In this paper we show how the use of David Carfì new coopetitive game model, which considers both collaboration and competition together and simultaneously, can advance the understanding and control of asymmetric R&D alliances between small Green Energy producers and large energy producers by carbon-fuels, in Congo. We consider the literature on asymmetric R&D cooperation and coopetition to propose a model of coopetitive game, which seems particularly suitable for exploring those types of asymmetric R&D alliances involving two energy firms and a venture capitalist in the foundation of a coopetitive Joint Venture. Specifically, we shall consider five players: a large firm (ENI), a small firm (Solar), a venture capitalist, a research joint venture (founded by the first two players) and finally the government of Congo, in which the productions take place. We graphically show that cooperative efforts are required (and beneficial for every player) even if the partners are potentially competitors in the energy market and we shape the common coopetitive payoff space, which they determine during the complex multi-faced interaction. We eventually show that the coopetitive partners can fairly balance their interaction dynamics and that this interaction affects both the value creation and value capture processes, improving the welfare and health conditions of Congo population.