Realismo e anti-realismo em Hegel

Hegel’s conception of thought is ‘non-internalist’ (as noted by Putnam, McDowell, Halbig, Quante, Siep, Westphal et al.). Yet, this is not sufficient to ascribe to Hegel a peculiar form of realism. Today, realism takes different forms. In general, realism can be defined as the view that our cognitive experience is true only if it mirrors reality as it is in itself, that is, reality is conceived as being independent from what is affirmed, proven, thought, or known of it. In this article I show: 1) that such a ‘realism’ is not compatible with Hegel’s philosophy, and 2) that its contemporary variation as ‘epistemological realism’ has undeniable affinities with the Hegelian conception of the knowledge. Yet, this affinity does not account for the distinctive features of Hegel’s philosophical proposal.