Escaping the trap of `blocking': A kinetic model linking economic development and political competition

In this paper we present a kinetic model with evolutive stochastic game-type interactions, analyzing the relationship between the level of political competition in a society and the degree of economic liberalization. The above issue regards the complex interactions between economy and institutional policies intended to introduce technological innovations in a society, where technological innovations are intended in a broad sense comprehending reforms critical to production. A special focus is placed on the political replacement effect described in a macroscopic model by Acemoglu and Robinson, which can determine the phenomenon of innovation `blocking', possibly leading to economic backwardness. One of the goals of our modelization is to obtain a mesoscopic dynamical model whose macroscopic outputs are qualitatively comparable with stylized facts of the AR-model and the comparison is settled in a number of case studies. A set of numerical solutions is presented showing the non monotonous relationship between economic liberalization and political competition in particular conditions, which can be considered as an emergent phenomenon of the analyzed complex socio-economic interaction dynamics.