Sensus Communis and Imagination as Precursors of Inner Perception in Brentano

Aim of this contribution is an inquiry about the double bind between both key notions of sensus communis (koiné aísthesis) and imagination in Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotelian psychology and in his later work. I will try to show how the treatment of these concepts prefigures Brentano’s theory of inner perception in its full-grown formulation. Strictly knit together with sensible imagination, as far as it allows for the coordination of the cognitive operations carried out by the proper senses and for establishing a level of metareflective awareness about them, sensus communis is defined as a modality of self-consciousness directly rooted in sense perception. Yet, at the same time, it provides for the genesis of a higher-order form of self-consciousness and of a structure of self-reference of all cognitive acts to their bearer. The theoretical issue at stake here consists in verifying if Brentano does really succeed in providing the adequate conceptual tools for the task of developing an unitary account of self-consciousness. This should be able to overcome the Cartesian-Kantian divide between the blind automatisms of sense perception and the empty certitude of a merely intellective awareness.