We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. We focus attention on assignment problems that must respect object-invariant (or uniform) weak priorities such as seniority rights in student residence assignment. We propose the sequential pseudomarket mechanism: the set of agents is partitioned into ordered priority groups that are called in turns to participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. SP is characterized by the concept of consistent weak ex-ante efficiency (CWEE), that is, weak ex-ante efficiency complemented by consistency to economy reduction. Moreover, it is shown that CWEE generically implies ex-ante efficiency.

Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights

Miralles, Antonio
Primo
Formal Analysis
2017-01-01

Abstract

We study random assignment economies with expected-utility agents, each of them eventually obtaining a single object. We focus attention on assignment problems that must respect object-invariant (or uniform) weak priorities such as seniority rights in student residence assignment. We propose the sequential pseudomarket mechanism: the set of agents is partitioned into ordered priority groups that are called in turns to participate in a pseudomarket for the remaining objects. SP is characterized by the concept of consistent weak ex-ante efficiency (CWEE), that is, weak ex-ante efficiency complemented by consistency to economy reduction. Moreover, it is shown that CWEE generically implies ex-ante efficiency.
2017
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
ROeD.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Tipologia: Altro materiale allegato (es. Copertina, Indice, Materiale supplementare, Brevetti, Spin off, Start up, etc.)
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione 481.13 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
481.13 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
3138752.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Descrizione: Articolo principale
Tipologia: Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione 471.81 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
471.81 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
Pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11570/3138752
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 2
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 2
social impact