Metaphor can be compared to analogy because they both have, additionally to their rhetorical competence, an epistemic force. Through analogy legal concepts are reproduced according to similarity; reproduction is always a new production and thus analogy and metaphor in law have a poietic force. The reproduction and production (poiesis) of legal concepts through metaphor by analogy concerns the interference between classificatory operations in law and legal epistemology: in every categorization of the unknown by means of the known, legal ontology and legal epistemology intersect.
Titolo: | Metaphor as Analogy: Reproduction and Production of Legal Concepts |
Autori: | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2016 |
Rivista: | |
Abstract: | Metaphor can be compared to analogy because they both have, additionally to their rhetorical competence, an epistemic force. Through analogy legal concepts are reproduced according to similarity; reproduction is always a new production and thus analogy and metaphor in law have a poietic force. The reproduction and production (poiesis) of legal concepts through metaphor by analogy concerns the interference between classificatory operations in law and legal epistemology: in every categorization of the unknown by means of the known, legal ontology and legal epistemology intersect. |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11570/3148193 |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 14.a.1 Articolo su rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.