In this work, I discuss the thesis of the infinity of knowledge, starting from the experience of non-knowledge. Does the experience of non-knowledge deny the infinity of knowing? Or doesn’t it? Even the non-knowledge, when affirmed, is in fact something known. The non-knowing that concerns us is always a determinate non-knowledge, that is non-absolute. Moreover, even our knowledge is always a non-absolute knowledge. However, it is also true that we necessarily know something. For example, we can know, in a necessary way that our thinking is not the Absolute, even if our thinking is somehow infinite. We are finite and infinite, according to different points of view. Because of our finitude, our knowing is always a historical knowing, and our experience of the object world is always a historical experience. It is the historical and never-ending experience of the transcendent Absolute.
L’esperienza storica e l’intrascendibilità del conoscere. Sul sapere di non sapere
PAOLO BETTINESCHI
2019-01-01
Abstract
In this work, I discuss the thesis of the infinity of knowledge, starting from the experience of non-knowledge. Does the experience of non-knowledge deny the infinity of knowing? Or doesn’t it? Even the non-knowledge, when affirmed, is in fact something known. The non-knowing that concerns us is always a determinate non-knowledge, that is non-absolute. Moreover, even our knowledge is always a non-absolute knowledge. However, it is also true that we necessarily know something. For example, we can know, in a necessary way that our thinking is not the Absolute, even if our thinking is somehow infinite. We are finite and infinite, according to different points of view. Because of our finitude, our knowing is always a historical knowing, and our experience of the object world is always a historical experience. It is the historical and never-ending experience of the transcendent Absolute.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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