In this article, I defend a meta-normative account of constitutivism by specifically addressing what I take to be a fundamental criticism of the constitutivist stance, namely, the objection that constitutive standards have conceptual, not normative, force, and so that no practical normativity can be extracted from them as constitutive of agency. In reply to this objection, I argue that the conceptual role of the standards constitutive of agency-their applying to us by virtue of our being the kinds of creatures we are-does not exclude, but rather combines with, the normative role the same standards play in our practical life. © 2013 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
Constitutivism and normativity: A qualified defence
Bertea S.
2013-01-01
Abstract
In this article, I defend a meta-normative account of constitutivism by specifically addressing what I take to be a fundamental criticism of the constitutivist stance, namely, the objection that constitutive standards have conceptual, not normative, force, and so that no practical normativity can be extracted from them as constitutive of agency. In reply to this objection, I argue that the conceptual role of the standards constitutive of agency-their applying to us by virtue of our being the kinds of creatures we are-does not exclude, but rather combines with, the normative role the same standards play in our practical life. © 2013 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.Pubblicazioni consigliate
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