LA TEORIA HUSSERLIANA DELLA PERCEZIONE CATEGORIALE E LA FONDAZIONE OBIETTIVA DELL’IDEALITÀ DEL SIGNIFICATO NELL’ESPERIENZA INTUITIVA

This contribution focuses on Husserl’s theory of categorial perception and intends to highlight how it responds to three requirements : 1) to safeguard the unity and continuity of phenomenological experience, overcoming the division between sensibility and intellect ; 2) to attribute to categorial perception a superordinate position with respect to sensibility and intellect in which both are integrated ; 3) to demonstrate that categorial forms possess an objective consistency that can be directly found in perceived things. According to Husserl, categorial intuitions come by direct derivation from sensible perceptions, without any need for processes of abstraction or conceptualization of intellectual order. Although not themselves real objects, categorial forms enjoy an ideal identity and are immediately referred to real things and states of affairs. The Husserlian approach opposes empiricism and Kant’s reduction of categories to subjective functions, alternatively proposing to show how categorial forms emerge from experience itself and permeate it in its totality from its lower layers.