Derrida engages with Hegel’s reflections on reconciliation to explore the nature of forgiveness, arguing that forgiveness does not belong to the phenomenal, to economy and power. In Hegel’s philosophy, the word of reconciliation represents the manifestation of spirit in reality, much like public acts of repentance reflect traditional Christian ethics. According to this framework, forgiveness is conditional upon the acknowledgment of guilt, and reconciliation is seen as a healing process in which past wrongs are forgotten without leaving scars. However, Derrida challenges this view by proposing that forgiveness is secret, unconditional, and without purpose—it does not aim for redemption or reconciliation. Forgiveness, in his view, must simultaneously preserve the memory of wrongdoing without fostering resentment. Unlike Hegelian forgiveness, which functions within a system of justice and obligation— akin to the Christian imperative to forgive in order to be forgiven—Derrida’s forgiveness belongs to an entirely different order. While Hegelian forgiveness disrupts retributive justice, it remains a law and an economy; it is possible, as I can forgive, I have the power to do so. Derrida, by contrast, envisions forgiveness as belonging to an aneconomic justice, one that does not restore balance. Forgiveness, in this sense, is powerless, impossible—it is a grace.
The Word of Reconciliation: Derrida listening to Hegels’ Voice-Off
SURACE V
2025-01-01
Abstract
Derrida engages with Hegel’s reflections on reconciliation to explore the nature of forgiveness, arguing that forgiveness does not belong to the phenomenal, to economy and power. In Hegel’s philosophy, the word of reconciliation represents the manifestation of spirit in reality, much like public acts of repentance reflect traditional Christian ethics. According to this framework, forgiveness is conditional upon the acknowledgment of guilt, and reconciliation is seen as a healing process in which past wrongs are forgotten without leaving scars. However, Derrida challenges this view by proposing that forgiveness is secret, unconditional, and without purpose—it does not aim for redemption or reconciliation. Forgiveness, in his view, must simultaneously preserve the memory of wrongdoing without fostering resentment. Unlike Hegelian forgiveness, which functions within a system of justice and obligation— akin to the Christian imperative to forgive in order to be forgiven—Derrida’s forgiveness belongs to an entirely different order. While Hegelian forgiveness disrupts retributive justice, it remains a law and an economy; it is possible, as I can forgive, I have the power to do so. Derrida, by contrast, envisions forgiveness as belonging to an aneconomic justice, one that does not restore balance. Forgiveness, in this sense, is powerless, impossible—it is a grace.Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


