A competitive bargaining set is a finite collection of allocation, each of them being supported by a coalition, characterized by internal and external stability. Perticularly, each core allocation, together the set of all consumers represents a competitive bargaining set. The existence of the competitive bargaining set is proved for exchange economies if the preferences are represented by continuous monotonic utility functions. A new concept extending the classical notion of core is proposed.
Bargaining Dynamics in Abstract Exchange Economies
Barilla D.
Primo
Conceptualization
2025-01-01
Abstract
A competitive bargaining set is a finite collection of allocation, each of them being supported by a coalition, characterized by internal and external stability. Perticularly, each core allocation, together the set of all consumers represents a competitive bargaining set. The existence of the competitive bargaining set is proved for exchange economies if the preferences are represented by continuous monotonic utility functions. A new concept extending the classical notion of core is proposed.File in questo prodotto:
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