«Non separava sophia e sōphrosynē» (Mem. III 9, 4): termini e limiti dell’intellettualismo etico negli scritti socratici di Senofonte

Xenophon provides crucial evidence on Socratic moral intellectualism, alluding to the doctrine of virtue-as-knowledge in various passages of the Memorabilia (I 1, 16 ; IV 6, 6 ; IV 6, 11), and offering a more detailed account in III 9, 4-5. However, a thorough analysis of the key concepts involved – extended to other sections of the Memorabilia and other works in the Xenophontic corpus – reveals inherent limitations to a fully intellectualist interpretation of Socratic ethics. First of all, besides the different status of sophia, the distinctive meaning and role given by Xenophon to the notions of sōphrosynē and enkrateia, central in III 9, 4, point to theses that are difficult to reconcile with the identification of virtue and knowledge. Secondly, both certain non-Socratic writings (notably Ages. XI 9) and other passages from the Memorabilia (IV 5, 6) indicate that akrasia is elsewhere not only acknowledged by Xenophon, but also ascribed to Socrates, in apparent tension with what is stated in III 9, 5 and IV 6, 6. The present paper aims to address these interpretive issues through a close analysis of the four key concepts of Xenophon’s account: sophia, sōphrosynē, enkrateia, and akrasia.