Abduction and Analogical Reasoning in Human Cognition and Metaphorical Thought

This paper explores the inferential processes underlying analogical reasoning, with a focus on its relationship to abduction. Peirce identified abduction as a central element of analogy (CP 1.65), and more specifically, as the cognitive mechanism uniquely responsible for the generation of new knowledge (CP 5.171). From this perspective, in this paper, I propose a typology of analogical reasoning based on the varying roles that abductive inference plays in the formation of analogical thought. To develop this framework, I draw on Peirce’s theory of abduction, as further refined by Eco’s (1981) typology of abductive processes. I argue that different types of abductive inferences give rise to distinct forms of analogy, each producing specific epistemic effects, ranging from quasi-immediate understanding to more elaborate processes that activate creative capacities. The typology of analogical reasoning developed here is then applied to metaphorical cognition in order to account for the different levels of cognitive complexity and the distinct epistemic functions that metaphors by analogy may have.