Conspiracy Theories: The Demarcation Problem

The debate about the definition and nature of conspiracy theories remains con- troversial, especially in philosophy. The divide between generalists, who focus on implausible theories, and particularists, who take a neutral stance, leads to an im- passe. Generalists dismiss theories as epistemically suspect, while particularists risk overlooking the troubling aspects of these theories. I argue for preserving some elements of the folk notion of conspiracy theories without endorsing its pejorative definition. In my view, it’s not the content of most conspiracy theories that makes them suspect, but the way they are often held and supported. Conspiracy theories, like other epistemically suspect beliefs (for example, delusional ideas or paranormal beliefs) are typically resistant to counterarguments. I am fully aware that the gener- alist notion of conspiracy theories may stigmatize those who challenge conventional authorities, but I think that, even if the expression «conspiracy theory» were elimi- nated, its problematic nature would still persist.