Selectivity of Bargaining and the Effect of Retirement on Labour Division in Italian Couples

Using Italian data on the Use of Time, in this study we analyse the influence of bargaining process between partners on the allocation of intra-household labour after the retirement of the male partner. Adopting an appropriate procedure to identify the effect of women's bargaining power, we find that men’s propensity to retire increases if women have strong bargaining power in labour division. This implies an overstatement of the effect of a man’s retirement on the housework of a woman with higher bargaining power and, conversely, an understatement of the effect of the man’s retirement on the housework time of a woman with lower bargaining power. To correct this selectivity effect, we estimate the effect of a man's retirement on the paid and domestic work of both partners by comparing couples in which the woman has high bargaining power and couples in which the woman has low bargaining power.